

Public Safety and Security in the 21st Century

THE
POLICE
FOUNDATION

The UK's policing think tank

THE FIRST REPORT OF
THE STRATEGIC REVIEW
OF POLICING IN
ENGLAND AND WALES

July 2020

PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY.

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About the Strategic Review of Policing in England and Wales

Launched by the Police Foundation in September 2019, the Strategic Review of Policing in England and Wales sets out to examine how crime, fear of crime and other threats to public safety are changing and assess the ability of the police to meet these challenges, as part of a wider strategic response. This far-reaching independent review, the first of its kind in many years, is being chaired by Sir Michael Barber and guided by an Advisory Board of former senior police officers, politicians and leading academics. The overall aim of the Review is to set the long-term strategic vision for English and Welsh policing. It will conclude in summer 2021 with a final report presenting substantial recommendations for a modern service capable of meeting the challenges of the 21st century. More information about the Review can be found at: <http://www.policingreview.org.uk>

The Strategic Review of Policing in England and Wales is being generously funded by the Dawes Trust, Deloitte and CGI.



About the Police Foundation

The Police Foundation is the only independent think tank focused exclusively on improving policing and developing knowledge and understanding of policing and crime reduction. Its mission is to generate evidence and develop ideas which deliver better policing and a safer society. It does this by producing trusted, impartial research and by working with the police and their partners to create change.

This report was written on behalf of the Strategic Review of Policing in England and Wales by Rick Muir and Stephen Walcott with contributions from Andy Higgins and Ruth Halkon.

Acknowledgments

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FOREWORD

The single most significant conclusion that I draw from this report is that the police service in England and Wales is not currently equipped to meet the scale, nature and complexity of the challenges it faces. The recruitment of an additional 20,000 police officers is very welcome and it is pleasing to see that so many applicants have already applied.

However, the police service of the future will need to look very different from the police service of today. This report shows that the challenge of keeping the public safe has been transformed over the last twenty years, and that the environment will continue to change dramatically in the next twenty.

While our current approach to policing might have been suitable for a time when the dominant crimes were car crime and burglary, today more people are affected by internet crime. While the additional police recruits are very welcome, we need to address major shortages of detectives who are required to deal with the increased reporting of sexual and domestic abuse crimes. The police on their own lack the tools and resources required to solve problems linked to mental illness, addiction and child neglect that are now a daily part of police work.

All of this means we need to think radically about the role we want the police to play in the future and about how they work with others. We need to think afresh about the future shape of the police workforce and how the police service is organised. And in all of this we need to make sure that policing commands the confidence of all communities.

Many thanks to all those who have taken their time to contribute to Phase One of this Strategic Review. During my visits to police forces I have been very impressed by the professionalism and commitment of the police officers and staff that I have met. Thank you to the respondents to our Call for Evidence, to those we interviewed and to the members of the Advisory Board for their thoughts and comments. I hope that as many people as possible will engage with the Review as it moves into its second phase, which will consider what the future of policing should look like in light of the challenges we have described in this report.

Sir Michael Barber

Chair of the Strategic Review of Policing
in England and Wales

SUMMARY

Ensuring that citizens feel safe and secure is one of the principle tasks of democratic government. Without a basic level of order and safety people are unable to go about their lives in liberty. As the challenges to public safety and security change over time societies must rethink how they go about this fundamental task. The police are one of the primary institutions through whose actions the state seeks to ensure the safety and security of its citizens. As the challenges to public safety and security change it is therefore important that we look afresh at how policing is oriented, organised and practiced.

This is the first major report from the Strategic Review of Policing in England and Wales, an independent inquiry into the future of policing chaired by Sir Michael Barber and undertaken by the Police Foundation.

It describes how the challenges to public safety and security have been transformed since the turn of the millennium, driven by three interconnected forces of technological change, globalisation and the rise of more complex social problems. Each of these has contributed to a more complex landscape of crime and harm which requires a radically different response from government, the police and wider society. In particular these forces have expanded the range of demands on the police, raising questions as to whether policing as currently constituted can meet the scope and complexity of the demands placed upon it.

This report represents the culmination of the first phase of the Strategic Review. It describes the nature of the public safety and security challenge facing the country as we look to the 2020s and 2030s. The second phase of the Review, to be concluded in 2021, will look at how we should respond to that challenge.

THE PUBLIC SAFETY CHALLENGE

The public safety challenges facing England and Wales have been transformed by technology, globalisation and the rise of more complex social problems. We are, on some measures, a safer society than we were at the turn of the millennium. However, the nature of the threats, risks and harms to which we are exposed have become more varied and complex. As a result, the task of policing has become more demanding.

Traditional volume crime has fallen by 70 per cent since the mid-1990s, including a 72 per cent fall in violent

crime, a 74 per cent fall in burglary and a 79.5 per cent fall in vehicle theft. Much of the drop in acquisitive crime has been driven by improvements in home and vehicle security and we have seen similar falls in other countries. There has also been a decline in the numbers of people who perceive antisocial behaviour to be a major problem in their area.

In place of these traditional crime and disorder issues we have seen a huge rise in crime committed on the internet, a venue for crime that did not exist thirty years ago and one which operates beyond the jurisdiction of local and national police agencies.

In 2019, fraud and computer misuse offences constituted 44 per cent of crime experienced in England and Wales, according to the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW). Fraud, most of which is cyber enabled, is now the most common type of crime experienced in England and Wales, making up 36 per cent of crime in 2019. In addition, we have seen the growth in online child sexual abuse, with more than 8.3 million unique abusive images added to the UK's Child Abuse Image Database in the last four years.

There has been an increased focus, by the police and wider society, on crimes that were scarcely regarded as policing issues decades ago, in particular violence, abuse and sexual crime that takes place in the home or in other private settings. Reports of domestic violence incidents increased by 77 per cent between 2016 to 2019; reports of stalking and harassment by 792 per cent between 2012 to 2019; reports of rape by 260 per cent between 2013 and 2019; and reports of child sexual offences by 204 per cent between 2012/13 and 2017/18.

This increase in reporting is likely to have been driven by greater confidence among victims that if they report these offences they will be taken seriously by the police and the criminal justice system. However, a huge rise in demand for complex areas of criminal investigation has proved to be a major challenge for police forces, who have been stretched in their capacity and tested in their capabilities, particularly where cases require the examination of large volumes of digital evidence.

As other public services have been cut back, the police have been left responding to increased numbers of incidents involving people with multiple disadvantages and whose needs cannot be met through traditional public service silos. It is estimated that mental health

related incidents reported to the police increased by 28 per cent between 2014 and 2018. The number of people detained by the police under the Mental Health Act increased by 23 per cent between 2016/17 and 2018/19. The number of missing person incidents reported to the police increased by 46 per cent between 2013/14 and 2016/17.

In any society social tensions can erupt posing challenges of public order and a risk of harm. There are signs that such tensions have heightened in recent years in England and Wales. For example, the number of protests involving confrontational tactics increased from seven in 2000 to 126 in 2019. We also saw a 144 per cent increase in hate crimes reported to the police between 2012/13 and 2018/19. The UK continues to be a target for terrorism from Northern Ireland based groups, Islamist networks and there is a growing threat from the far-right.

The coronavirus pandemic has revealed how a major emergency, arriving quickly from the other side of the world, can very suddenly wreak havoc on this country's health, welfare and economy. The number of major emergencies requiring a policing response has been growing in recent years, particularly linked to the impact of climate change which has led to an increase in the number of extreme weather events.

Organised crime groups have diversified their activities in response to the major changes in the global environment over the last twenty years, causing harm in new or previously hidden spaces, exploiting digital technology and operating across borders to an unprecedented degree.

For example, there has been increased awareness, reporting and activity in the area of modern slavery and human trafficking (MSHT), with more than 5,000 offences recorded by the police in 2018/19 involving over 7,000 victims from 130 countries.

We have also seen the rise of County Lines drug trafficking, whereby children and young people have been exploited by organised crime groups to directly export crack cocaine and heroin into small towns and rural areas. The change in the competitive dynamics within the drugs market seems to be the most significant factor in explaining the recent rise in serious violence, particularly knife crime.

Globalisation, the growth of the drugs market and new technologies, as well as changing law enforcement practices, have led many organised crime groups not only to diversify their tactics but to move away from traditional robbery and violence into more profitable

and less risky "white collar" activities, such as money laundering and fraud. These opportunities have also opened the way for new actors to get involved in crime, operating alone or as part of loose online networks.

The scope and diversity of these patterns of crime, harm and disorder pose a significant challenge to the police who have limited resources and whose traditional ways of operating have struggled to keep up with the scale and complexity of demand.

THE PUBLIC SECURITY CHALLENGE

How people experience crime, harm and policing is as important as the objective trends in threats, risks and harms described above. If people feel unsafe then this is likely to have an impact on their wellbeing and is therefore a legitimate and important focus of public policy.

According to opinion polls crime has been rising as a public concern since 2015 and in 2019 reached the same level of public concern as during the August 2011 riots. This is linked to the fact that more people think crime is rising, even though the overall crime rate as measured by the CSEW has remained fairly steady. Fear of crime is higher among those who live on low incomes, live in deprived areas or are black, Asian or of mixed ethnicity, compared to those who are white.

The police in England and Wales retain a strong bedrock of public support. 76 per cent of people say they trust the police and 75 per cent of people have overall confidence in the police. Having said that, public ratings for police understanding and acting on local concerns, being reliable, treating people fairly and of confidence in the local police have all declined in the last year.

People's experience of policing varies widely and, while some people see the police as contributors to their safety, others experience policing as a source of insecurity. Black people and those of mixed ethnicity are much less likely than white people, Asian people and those of other ethnicity to trust the police and be confident that the police will treat them fairly and with respect. These findings are long standing and reflect persistent disproportionalities in the use of police powers. Addressing the reasons for those disproportionalities and the lower levels of confidence in the police among some minority communities, particularly among black people, is a core challenge for the police service, and the country, in the years ahead.

LOOKING AHEAD

Having set out how the main public safety and security challenges have changed over the last 20 years, we turn to how they may evolve in the next 20 years. We identify a number of trends, both global and in our own country, that are likely to impact on public safety, security and policing as we approach the middle of the 21st century.

As digital devices become more powerful, numerous and interconnected citizens' exposure to cybercrime, already high, will only increase further. Whether and how to regulate this information space in order to protect citizens from harm will become a major site of political contestation, including between countries and regions of the world who are likely to take different approaches. If conventional policing agencies do not rise to the challenge of tackling internet crime, we will see more non state actors emerge to fill the vacuum.

As those who commit internet crime innovate with new technologies, such as artificial intelligence, policing and other actors charged with tackling online harm will need to continually invest in the digital tools and techniques required to keep up with the pace of change. In doing so they will need to address, with public input, the major ethical questions that arise in relation to privacy and surveillance.

Climate change will drive more extreme weather events and may also trigger increased political unrest. The ease of travel around the world and the trend towards urban living mean that pandemics will continue to be a major risk to public health. Police organisations will need to be sufficiently agile to respond to such major disruption.

Increased scrutiny of policing by citizens and more widespread consciousness of black people's experience of policing means that police agencies will be held to high ethical standards and subject to increased expectations in terms of accountability.

Community cohesion will continue to be tested by migration, which is likely to increase as a result of climate change and resource shortages. Hate crime may increase as a result of more harassment and bullying taking place online.

As the population ages the country will need to spend more on health, social care and pensions. This may constrain the government's ability to invest in policing and other public services. If this were to manifest itself in further public sector austerity, the challenge of managing incidents involving individuals who suffer from

multiple disadvantage is likely to remain a major feature of police work.

Finally, organised crime groups will exploit the opportunities this picture presents. Ensuring that we have policing capabilities to tackle those who operate across borders and are becoming increasingly networked and agile, will be a core challenge of the next decade and beyond.

THE PURPOSE OF THE POLICE

Having set out the public safety and security challenge facing the country we turn to the role of the police in meeting that challenge.

In the Peelian tradition, the question of the role and purpose of the police can only be answered with reference to the public. The police in England and Wales are not only publicly funded, public-facing and publicly accountable, but draw their ideological legitimacy and power from public approval, consent and cooperation.

Focus group research undertaken by the Police Foundation in 2019 generated three findings of particular relevance to this Review:

- There is support among members of the public for visible local policing.
- When provided with more information about the nature of contemporary police work, there is support for the police prioritising high harm areas such as violent and sexual crime over lower level disorder issues.
- Although participants in our focus groups recognised the range and diversity of modern public safety challenges, when it came to deciding what the police specifically should do, they felt compelled to limit this to what was 'crime-related' or 'just the immediate crisis'.

We make the following working assumptions about the purpose of the police to inform the Review as we move into its second phase:

- Policing is not just about tackling crime but is a 24/7 responsive service which has to deal with a wide range of threats to public order and actual and potential harm to individuals.
- In performing this role, the police operate as part of a wider system of actors who contribute to public safety and security. The increased scope and complexity of the challenges we face mean that the

police cannot tackle these issues alone and, in many cases, other actors will be better placed to take the lead. What this broader system of public safety should look like will be a core focus for Phase Two of this Review, where we will seek to understand how the relationships between policing and other actors operate and whether they need re-thinking to meet the demands of the 21st century.

- The police should seek to proactively prevent crime and harm, rather than simply respond to it. In thinking about the role of the police as a preventative agency, we need to be clear as to what the police are best equipped to do and what should be the role of others.
- There has been a shift in police work in recent years, as a result of changes in demand and in law, towards safeguarding and responding to incidents involving people who live with multiple disadvantages. As a 24/7 general response service, the police inevitably play an important role in dealing with such incidents. It will be important in Phase Two to consider what the scope of their role should be and what skills and competencies police officers require to perform this role most effectively.
- The issue of the policing mission not only relates to what the police do, but, crucially, to how they do it. How secure people feel is in part a function of how confident they are in the institutions that exist to protect them. This underlines the importance of the police treating people fairly and with respect, responding to calls for assistance from wherever they come, and actively engaging with the public and their representatives about how they do their essential work.

This report has revealed how dramatically the landscape of safety and security has changed since the turn of the millennium. While we have in some ways become a safer society, this is not everyone's experience and new forms of risk and harm have arisen. The expanded scope, increased variety and more complex nature of the challenges we face require us to ask fundamental questions about how we should promote public safety and security in the 21st century.

These challenges require us to think afresh about the role of the police. With limited resources and an established core of existing skills and competencies, the police will not be able to meet all of the demands placed upon them. There is a danger of a growing gap between what the police are able to deliver and what the public has come to expect.

This requires us in Phase Two of this Review to think from first principles about what we believe the role of the police should be and what should be the role of other actors and institutions who play a role in public safety and security. Considering what this wider system of public safety should look like will be a core focus for the next phase of the Review.

The report has also highlighted how people's experience of policing itself has an impact on their security. Being able to rely on the police to respond in times of emergency to any person, without fear or favour, is a hard-won achievement. However, many within minority communities experience policing negatively and in Phase Two we will explore how the legitimacy of the police can be strengthened in the years ahead.

Once we have addressed those questions around the role of the police as part of a wider system, and how they can perform this role while commanding community confidence, we will then examine what skills and competencies they will require, how they should be financed and how the police service should be structured and held to account.

Therefore the key questions shaping Phase Two of the Review will be:

1. What is the role of the police, and how should it evolve over the next 20 years, building on the working assumptions set out in this report?
2. What should be the relationship between the public police service and other agencies and actors involved in public safety and security?
3. How can the legitimacy of policing be strengthened, particularly with those parts of our community among whom confidence in the police is low?
4. What are the implications of questions 1, 2 and 3, and of the changing landscape described in this report for the future police workforce?
5. How should the public police service be resourced?
6. How should it be organised, locally, regionally and nationally?
7. How should it be governed and held to account?

It is our conviction at this stage that the scope, nature and variety of the challenges we face as a country require us to think afresh about the role of the police in achieving public safety and security in the first half of the 21st century.

1. INTRODUCTION

Ensuring that citizens feel safe and secure is one of the principle tasks of democratic government. Without a basic level of order and safety people are unable to go about their lives in liberty. As the challenges to public safety and security change over time, societies must rethink how they go about this fundamental task. The police are one of the primary institutions through which the state seeks to ensure the safety and security of its citizens. As the challenges to public safety and security change, it is therefore important that we look afresh at how policing is oriented, organised and practiced.

This is the first major report from the Strategic Review of Policing in England and Wales, an independent inquiry into the future of policing chaired by Sir Michael Barber and undertaken by the Police Foundation.

The report describes how the challenges to public safety and security have been transformed since the turn of the millennium, driven by three interconnected forces of technological change, globalisation and the rise of more complex social problems.

The digital revolution has meant that crime has escaped the boundaries of the nation state and much of it now occurs in a largely unregulated information space. Greater global interconnectedness means that events on the other side of the world can, with astonishing speed, now cause major disruption in this country. Changes in social norms, as well as the public response to a number of high-profile cases, have liberated many previously hidden victims of crime to report the harms done to them, providing many with a route to justice, but leading to new demands on the police. Those who are socially excluded and have complex needs are increasingly coming to the attention of the police, posing new challenges in balancing the tasks of protection, enforcement and social repair.

As a result, we are faced with a more complex landscape of crime, harm and disorder and this poses major questions as to how safety and security can be provided for in the future. Of specific relevance to this Review, it poses fundamental questions regarding the role of the police. Can a policing system set up to deal with local crime and disorder effectively tackle crime that operates in an information space beyond the reach of local and national jurisdictions? Are the police the right agency to be handling such large volumes of mental health related incidents? How can the police get the balance right between a public appetite for ‘bobbies

on the beat’ and a shift in demand to crimes and harms that are hidden from view?

Despite this huge change in the external environment, the police operate within the same basic structures bestowed by the last Royal Commission on the Police in 1962. The last significant set of police reforms took place in 2010, but these focused on enhancing local political accountability rather than addressing the major changes in police demand driven by technology, globalisation and social change.

It is for these reasons that in 2019 the Police Foundation launched the Strategic Review of Policing in England and Wales. This is the first major independent enquiry into the future of the police service for many years. The Review is chaired by Sir Michael Barber and is supported by an Advisory Board, involving distinguished figures of different views and backgrounds, from inside and outside policing.

The Review represents an opportunity to take a fresh look at how we can go about securing public safety and security in a democratic society and in particular at the way our country is policed.

The Review is being undertaken in two parts, with Phase One seeking to understand the nature of the public safety and security challenge facing the country through the 2020s and 2030s. This report represents the culmination of our work on Phase One, setting out a consolidated picture of the nature of the public safety and security challenge facing England and Wales. Phase Two will run for a further 12 months and will address how policing (and the country) ought to respond to that challenge, focusing on:

- The role and purpose of policing.
- How the police should operate within a wider system of actors and institutions who contribute to public safety.
- How the legitimacy of the police can be strengthened particularly among those parts of our community where confidence in the police is low.
- How the police workforce ought to be equipped to fulfil the tasks set for them.
- How the police service should be financed.
- How policing is organised and how it is held to account.

1.1 OUTLINE OF THE REPORT

This report comes in five parts:

First, in Chapter 2, we describe the nature of the public safety challenges facing the country today and how these have changed in recent years. These incorporate the threats to safety that tend to fall within the broad remit of policing, including crime, disorder and other forms of personal harm. We see that the changes in these public safety challenges are being driven by technology, globalisation and greater social complexity. They are encapsulated under seven broad trends:

- There has been a significant decline in traditional volume crime, such as burglary and vehicle theft, since the mid-1990s.
- There has been a big rise in internet crime as digital technology has created a new venue in which crime and harm can take place.
- Organised crime groups are exploiting the vulnerable and harming the economy and communities in more sophisticated ways.
- Society is no longer willing to tolerate violence and abuse that takes place in homes or other private institutions.
- Many of those who are multiply disadvantaged face greater risks to their health and wellbeing and lack the resources to mitigate these.
- There are signs of rising social tension that can be seen in reports of hate crime and, at an extreme end, in the form of political extremism and terrorism.
- There are increasing risks of major disruptive events that can cause sudden and widespread harm and require an agile emergency response.

Second, in Chapter 3, we explore the more subjective aspects of security. Security is about more than just the objective threats to safety, manifested in crime rates and other reported incidents. It is also a product of how safe people feel and how confident they are in the resources and institutions that exist to protect them. To explore this, we examine what has happened to the fear

of crime in recent years. We also explore people's trust and confidence in the police, given that how people feel about the way in which they are policed and what this says about their membership of the wider community is a constitutive component of their sense of security.

Third, we set out how we expect these public safety and security challenges to evolve through to the middle of the 21st century. We do not have a crystal ball and we are clear that events will occur that cannot be predicted in advance and that these could very well transform the landscape. Nonetheless we identify a set of 10 global trends that can be expected to shape the context for public safety and security over the next twenty years.

Fourth, after setting out the public safety and security challenge facing the country, we turn to the role of the police in meeting that challenge. We explain why it is important to revisit this question and examine three of the major perspectives that tend to shape contemporary discussion of the police purpose: the police as crime fighters, the police as order maintainers and the police as protectors of the vulnerable. We also draw on survey and focus group findings to explore what members of the public think about the purpose of the police. We conclude by setting out some working assumptions about the role of the police that will help focus our work in Phase Two of the Review.

Finally, we introduce the key strands of work we will undertake in the second phase of the Review, which focuses on how policing should respond to the challenges identified in this report.

1.2 METHODS

Before moving on to the substance of the report we first set out what we did to generate its findings.

1.2.1 Data analysis and secondary reading

In order to determine the challenge that the police service should be prepared, organised, equipped and resourced to meet, Police Foundation researchers began by examining the changing nature of crime and of the demands placed on the police.

1 We collated these into a standard taxonomy of crime and harm types, understanding of course that there would be significant amounts of overlap in terms of offences, victims and perpetrators, and some elements would defy classification. This taxonomy was modelled on the International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes (ICCS) which was approved by the United Nations Statistical Commission, at its 46th session in March 2015, as an international statistical standard for data collection. This had the advantage of being based on behavioural definitions rather than individual national legal codes and is intended to be exhaustive and to promote mutual exclusivity (European Commission 2017). The taxonomy was populated with crime data from sources including the Crime Survey of England and Wales and the Home Office to build a picture of how crime has changed in the last decade.

We examined changes in different categories of crime and other demand on the police over recent years. Initially we collated these into a standard taxonomy of crime and harm types and combined this with a survey of the relevant academic literature written since 2015. The product of this taxonomic survey was then resolved into the seven key themes described in Chapter 2.¹

1.2.2 The Call for Evidence

In October 2019, the Police Foundation launched a public Call for Evidence for Phase 1 of the Strategic Review to gather the views of practitioners, stakeholders and other interested parties on challenges the police service should be prepared to face over the coming decades. The Call for Evidence included six questions covering four areas:

- Crime, threat and demand
- Public and societal expectations
- The purpose of the police
- Future trends

The Call for Evidence was made publicly available on the Police Foundation website and advertised and disseminated via policing and our social media feeds. In addition, responses were specifically invited from individuals and organisations with a stake in policing, including Chief Constables and Police and Crime Commissioners, law enforcement agencies, charities, community groups and relevant private sector stakeholders. In total, the Review received 65 responses before the closing date in December 2019. A full list of respondents is included in Appendix A. Responses were thematically analysed using the qualitative data analysis programme NVivo.

1.2.3 Key Informant Interviews

Alongside the Call for Evidence, Police Foundation researchers interviewed 16 key informants from within and beyond policing in order to gain an informed and rounded perspective on the current state of policing and the challenges policing will need to address in the immediate future. A discussion guide was drawn up which focused on:

- The changing nature of crime, threats to public safety and 'demand' on police, and the drivers of those changes.
- The public's expectations, views and needs relating to policing.
- The police mission.

- Their thoughts on the future, and issues that are likely to emerge and become significant over the coming years.

The interviews were semi structured and lasted around an hour. The majority were recorded, transcribed and coded thematically using NVivo software alongside the Calls for Evidence material. A full list of contributors can be found in Appendix B.

1.2.4 The Advisory Board

The work of the Review is guided by an Advisory Board, chaired by Sir Michael Barber and made up of former senior police officers, politicians and leading academics. The Advisory Board members have used their expertise to contribute informed views surrounding the challenges facing policing, as well as providing expert commentary and feedback on the Review's Terms of Reference and its output including the Insight Papers and this Phase One report. Some members of the Board also contributed research and Insight Papers. The makeup of the Board is set out in Appendix C.

1.2.5 Stakeholder engagement

In addition, the Review has engaged with key stakeholders, including academics, police practitioners and private sector experts who helped provide a more comprehensive picture of the current policing landscape and used their expertise to inform the Review. The engagement was done through one-to-one conversations as well as formal meetings and events. Sir Michael Barber visited Gwent, South Wales and Warwickshire Police to spend some time observing and talking to police officers and staff.

1.2.6 Insight papers

Alongside this Phase 1 report, the Police Foundation authored or commissioned two Insight Papers, to inform the deliberations of the Strategic Review. The content of these papers does not represent the Review's final conclusions or recommendations but provides an input and a stimulus for discussion, based on research and analysis by the Police Foundation and external contributors. The first Insight Paper, written by Police Foundation Research Director Andy Higgins, focused on the public's perceptions of, and priorities for, today's police service and provided ten key insights that helped shape the Review's thinking about the challenge the police face. The second paper, written by Professor Ian Loader, explored the history of the policing mission and addressed questions about the purpose of the police in the 21st century.

2. THE PUBLIC SAFETY CHALLENGE

This chapter draws together our assessment of the public safety challenge facing England and Wales at the start of the 2020s. We understand these challenges to public safety to be the objective threats or risks to the safety of the public. These challenges constitute harms that fall within the sphere of the criminal law as well as broader threats to the safety and wellbeing of citizens that fall within the broad remit of policing.²

Based on an analysis of crime and incident data, as well as a reading of the secondary literature and the responses to our interviews and Call for Evidence, we describe the contemporary public safety challenge under seven broad headings:

- *Traditional volume crime*: There has been a large fall in traditional volume crime since the mid-1990s.
- *Internet crime*: There has been a big rise in internet crime as digital technology has opened up new opportunities for committing crime and causing harm.
- *Organised crime*: Organised crime groups are exploiting people and harming the economy and communities in more sophisticated ways.
- *Violence and abuse in private settings*: Society is less willing to tolerate violence and abuse that takes place in homes or in other private institutions.
- *Precarious lives*: Many of those who suffer from multiple disadvantages face greater risks to their health and wellbeing and lack the resources to mitigate these.
- *Social tension*: There are signs of rising social tension that can be seen in reports of hate crime and at an extreme end in the form of political extremism and terrorism.
- *Major disruption*: There are increasing risks of major disruptive events that can cause widespread harm and require an agile emergency response.

2 We note that we ought not to assume that the current remit of policing is the right one and the scope and role of the police is a subject of our deliberations as part of this Review. We set out some working assumptions about this in Chapter 5, but we will return to these questions in greater depth in Phase Two.

2.1 TRADITIONAL VOLUME CRIME

Key points

Since 1995:

- Crime has fallen by 70 per cent, excluding computer misuse offences and fraud.
- Violent crime has fallen by 72 per cent.
- Domestic burglary has fallen by 74 per cent.
- Vehicle related theft has fallen by 79.5 per cent.

Crime, as measured by the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW), has fallen significantly since the mid-1990s (Figure 2.1) (ONS 2020a). In 1995, there were an estimated 19.7 million crimes committed, but this had fallen to 5.8 million by 2019. These figures exclude fraud and computer misuse offences, which were only introduced into the survey in 2017 and which take the 2019 figure to 10.4 million offences. That means, if we exclude fraud and computer misuse offences, 'traditional crime' has fallen by 70 per cent since the mid-1990s, an extraordinary drop in crime.


The addition of cybercrime and fraud offences to these figures shows that what initially looked like a sharp overall fall masked an increase in crime taking place on the internet. Nevertheless, the volume and prevalence of crime is still much lower today than it was in the mid-1990s. According to the Office for National Statistics (ONS), eight out of ten people in the CSEW did not experience *any* of the crimes asked about in the survey in the year to December 2019 (ONS, 2020a).

This 'crime drop' is driven largely by falls in what we call 'traditional volume crime', the sorts of offences that are less serious in terms of the harm caused but which tend to affect large numbers of people. Breaking down the falls since 1995 we can see that (ONS, 2020a):

- Violent crime (of any severity) fell from 4.46 million offences a year in 1995 to 1.24 million offences a year in 2019 (a 72 per cent fall).

Figure 2.1 Crime in England and Wales 1981 to 2019

Source: ONS, 2020a



- Violence with injury fell from 2.62 million offences in 1995 to 0.57 million offences in 2019 (a 78 per cent fall) and violence without injury fell from 1.84 million offences in 1995 to 0.66 million in 2019 (a 64 per cent fall).
- Theft fell from 11.6 million offences in 1995 3.4 million in 2019 (a 71 per cent fall).
- Domestic burglary fell from 2.34 million in 1995 to 0.61 million in 2019 (a 74 per cent fall).
- Vehicle related theft fell from 4.3 million in 1995 to 0.88 million in 2019 (a 79.5 per cent fall).
- Other household theft fell from 1.55 million in 1995 to 0.60 million in 2019 (a 61 per cent fall).

There are some qualifications that ought to be made in relation to this crime drop. First, as has been pointed out by researchers at Cambridge University, not all crimes should be counted equally. The Cambridge Harm Index represents one way of trying to measure the harm caused by different type of crime rather than simply counting a crime of sexual assault as if it were equivalent to a crime of shoplifting, for example.

According to Sherman et al (2016), between 2002/03 and 2011/12 “the crime count...dropped by 37 per cent (from 5,151,767 to 3,229,586). The Cambridge Harm

Index, in contrast, only dropped by 21 per cent (from 147,835,399 imprisonable CHI days to 117,835,466). If harm is our metric, then the crime count over-estimated the drop in crime impact, or the increase in public safety, by 76 per cent relative to the proportional drop in CHI.”

Although these metrics rely on police-recorded rather than survey based measures of crime, and therefore tell us more about police ‘workloads’ than crime as it is experienced by the public, they do however reflect the fact that while crime has fallen, those types of crime that fell most were generally less serious ones.

Second, we should be cautious about taking this fall in crime since the mid-1990s as being attributable to unique public policy successes in England and Wales. It ought to be noted that volume crime seems to have fallen in many other wealthy countries over the same period. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime between 2003 and 2018 (or 2016 for France):³

- In the United States, burglary fell by 46 per cent and car theft by 40 per cent.
- In Germany, burglary fell by 25 per cent and car theft by 54 per cent.
- In France, burglary fell by six per cent and car theft by 43.5 per cent.

³ It should be noted that international comparisons should be made with caution, simply because countries record crime differently, recording rules can change over time and countries often use different definitions for offences. See <https://dataunodc.un.org/>

These trends suggest that the causes of the volume crime drop are likely to be common across developed countries (which were pursuing a varied set of policy responses). Indeed, there is strong evidence that much of the fall in domestic burglary and vehicle crime was due to improvements in home and vehicle security during this period.⁴

Third, as we shall discuss below, some of the most harmful forms of crime appear to have increased in recent years. According to the ONS (2020a):

- Offences involving knives or sharp instruments recorded by the police increased from 30,620 in 2011 to 45,627 in 2019 (a 49 per cent increase)
- Homicides broadly fell between 2003 and 2015, falling from 1047 to 539 (a 48.5 per cent fall) but have picked up again rising to 670 in 2019 (a 24 per cent rise since 2015).

We discuss some of the drivers behind these trends in the sections that follow.


There are two main ways in which crime is measured in England and Wales. The first is to use police recorded crime data. This can be helpful in that it indicates the shape of demand on the police and it can pick up new trends, particularly for types of crime where reporting levels are high and/or overall population incidence is low. However, police recorded crime data does not always accurately reflect crime as experienced by the

public. Many crimes, particularly sexual crime and domestic abuse crimes, for example, are substantially under-reported and are therefore not accurately reflected in police data. Crime recording standards and protocols have also changed over time, meaning that police recorded crime can go up or down due to administrative practices rather than any real change in crime; for this reasons police recorded crime data is no longer considered a National Statistic. Recorded crime data also reflects police activity. For example, recorded drugs offences tend to go up when the police undertake more stops and searches. The other main way of measuring crime, which generally represents crime as it is experienced by the public more accurately is to use victimisation surveys, such as the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW). The CSEW provides a more accurate picture of overall crime levels and trends over time. However it should be noted that it only surveys those aged 16 and over, does not reflect crime committed against businesses or other organisations and is less able to produce accurate estimates of less frequently occurring crimes (such as gun crimes or the most serious violence, for example). It also caps some repeat incidents, so that it may not accurately reflect the level of repeat victimisation.

Another area of public safety demand that was prominent in the early 2000s was antisocial behaviour. Here too we see some significant change, at least at the level of reporting and public perceptions. As shown in Figure 2.2, perceived levels of antisocial behaviour as a very or fairly big problem have declined steadily

Figure 2.2 Levels of perceived antisocial behaviour (% of respondents)


Source: ONS, 2020a



4 See Tseloni et al 2017, who show that falling domestic burglary rates in England are most likely explained by improved home security measures <https://crimesciencejournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s40163-017-0064-2>

Figure 2.3 Number of police recorded ASB incidents

Source: ONS, 2020a



since 2003, from 21 per cent to seven per cent in 2019. Similarly, Figure 2.3 shows that the number of antisocial behaviour incidents recorded by the police has also been in steady decline, although we do not know if this reflects a decline in incidents, a decline in the willingness to report or indeed a shift in police focus away from this area of work.

It is notable that the experience of antisocial behaviour reported in these surveys is heavily skewed by the socio-economic profile of the neighbourhood in which the respondent lives. The latest figures show that 16 per cent of people in the 20 per cent most deprived areas think that antisocial behaviour is a very or fairly big problem, compared to just 1.5 per cent in the 20 per cent least deprived areas.

2.2 INTERNET CRIME

Key points:

- Fraud and computer misuse now make up 44 per cent of all crime in England and Wales.
- Fraud is the most commonly experienced type of crime.
- The volume of Child Sexual Abuse (CSA) imagery online is vast. Some 8.3 million unique images were added to the Child Abuse Image Database in four years to 2019 and this number is growing

The creation of the internet and the spread of digital technology has transformed the nature of crime, creating a new venue (cyber space) in which crimes can take place.

We can distinguish between three forms of 'cybercrime':⁵

- Cyber dependent crimes "are offences that can only be committed by using a computer, computer networks, or other form of ICT".
- Cyber enabled crimes "are traditional crimes that are increased in their scale or reach by the use of computers, computer networks or other ICT".
- Cyber assisted crimes are crimes that "use networked digital technologies in the course of criminal activity which would take place anyway".

The scale of internet crime is obvious from the CSEW, which was amended from 2017 to include, for the first time, computer misuse and fraud offences (see Figure 2.4).

The CSEW data reveals that:


- Fraud and computer misuse offences make up 44 per cent of crime detected in the survey in the year to December 2019.
- Computer misuse offences made up nine per cent of crimes against households in 2019 (they also make up a large proportion of crimes against businesses).
- Fraud offences, many of which are cyber enabled or cyber dependent crimes, made up 35.5 per cent of crime in 2019, the most common type of crime.

If we include cyber assisted crimes then it is likely that an even larger number of crimes falls within the basket of internet crime. This has enormous implications for policing, in particular, for the investigation of crime

5 See Skidmore et al (2018) More than just a number.

Figure 2.4 CSEW crime excluding fraud and computer misuse up to March 2019 and then including fraud and computer misuse

Source: ONS, 2020a



and the work of digital forensic units. We were told by respondents to our Call for Evidence that the sheer volumes of data that are now potentially relevant in the course of criminal inquiries are enormous and could potentially overwhelm already stretched police units responsible for extracting evidence from digital devices.

In what follows, we look in more detail at three types of crime that have expanded enormously as a result of the digital revolution: computer misuse, fraud and online child sexual abuse.⁶

2.2.1 Computer misuse offences

Computer misuse crime covers any unauthorised access to computer material, as set out in the Computer Misuse Act 1990. This is not limited to desk or laptop computers and can include any device using operating software accessible online. It includes offences such as spreading computer viruses, hacking and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks (the flooding of internet servers to take down network infrastructure or websites).

The CSEW is the best source for data on computer misuse offences affecting households, given that only a relatively small proportion of such offences are reported to the police. In 2019, the police recorded 23,135 offences, while the CSEW identified 915,000 such offences against households. While such offences

have clearly expanded in recent years, since the CSEW started asking about cybercrime in 2017, the number of these offences has actually declined, which may reflect improved IT security measures or behaviour change by IT users (Figure 2.5). There has been a 63 per cent fall in computer virus offences over that period, while unauthorised access offences have fallen by 9 per cent.

According to the latest National Strategic Threat Assessment by the National Crime Agency (NCA), much of the threat from cybercrime comes from overseas, with Russian language groups believed to be responsible for the most serious attacks. UK criminal involvement with these groups tends to be in the form of individuals acting as money mules and laundering money (NCA, 2020). The NCA assesses that the ‘bar to entry’ into cybercrime has become progressively lower in recent years, as tools and networks become more easily available online.


2.2.2 Fraud

Fraud makes up around a third of crime experienced by households in England and Wales, making it the most commonly experienced type of crime, followed by theft. Fraud involves a person dishonestly and deliberately deceiving a victim for personal gain of property or money or causing loss or risk of loss to another. It has existed as a criminal offence for centuries in this

⁶ There are of course other forms of online crime, which we cover in the relevant sections later in the chapter.

Figure 2.5 Computer misuse offences in England and Wales 2016-2019

Source: ONS, 2020a



country, but while it was in the past seen as a largely ‘white collar’ crime affecting business, it is now a volume crime affecting more than three million people a year.

The reason for that explosion in fraud is the internet, which has enabled people to commit fraud on an industrial scale. According to a Police Foundation analysis, 69 per cent of fraud cases investigated by the police in 2016/17 included at least one element of cybercrime. 27 per cent of these cases were by definition cybercrime, while a further 43 per cent involved initial contact with the victim being made online (Skidmore et al, 2018).

It is estimated that the United Kingdom loses between £130 and £190 billion a year to fraud (Gee and Button,


2019). Far from being a victimless crime, fraud not only harms UK institutions but can have a devastating effect on victims, nearly half of whom felt their financial loss impacted their emotional wellbeing (Skidmore et al, 2018).

In the years since the CSEW started measuring fraud victimisation it has increased by 12 per cent (between March 2017 and March 2019) (Figure 2.6). The largest proportion of fraud in the CSEW is bank and credit account fraud, followed by retail and consumer fraud.

Although the statistics from the Crime Survey of England and Wales only cover a couple of years, they are in line with trends from other sources such as incidents reported to the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) by Action Fraud (the national fraud and

Figure 2.6 Fraud and computer misuse offences 2016/17- 2018/19

Source: ONS 2020b



cybercrime reporting centre) as well as industry bodies, Cifas and UK Finance.

Compared with the scale of fraud perpetrated in England and Wales, the police response to it is very limited. While there are over three million cases each year, only around 260,000 are reported to Action Fraud, the national police portal for reporting fraud and cybercrime. Of 260,000 cases recorded by Action Fraud each year, on average, only 27 per cent are disseminated to police forces for an investigation and just three per cent end with a judicial outcome, meaning that many victims are falling through the cracks (Skidmore et al 2018). Respondents to our Call for Evidence described the police response to fraud as “embarrassing” and “inadequate” and stated that Action Fraud and some police forces have been losing public confidence as a result.

2.2.3 Online child sexual abuse

Another crime type that has been transformed by the internet is the sexual abuse of children. Whereas in the past the availability of child sexual abuse (CSA) imagery was limited to all but the most committed offenders, with the growth of online communications and social media, it is now relatively easy to access.

The volume of CSA imagery online is vast (some 8.3 million unique images were added to the Child Abuse Image Database in four years to 2019) and this number is growing. The number of industry referrals regarding CSA imagery to the NCA increased from 1591 in 2009 to 113,948 by 2018. Since 2016, between 400 and 450 people are arrested every month in the UK in relation to online CSA (IICSA 2020). The number of UK based victims identified from sexual abuse imagery has also been rising, increasing to 552 in 2018/19 (ONS, 2020c).

There are growing concerns about the amount of self-generated imagery being produced, which can be the result of consensual sharing of images between children such as in sexting or the product of grooming and exploitation of a child by an adult. The Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) estimates that self-generated imagery makes up one third of the material it removes from the internet. Research commissioned by the ongoing Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA) found that girls in the 11 to 14 age group appear to be most vulnerable to online facilitated child sexual abuse (IICSA, 2020).

Only a small proportion of these crimes are reported by victims to the authorities, although increased reporting has led to large increases in demand on the police. In 2016/17, police forces in England and Wales recorded 5,653 incidents of sexual crimes against children where

there was an online element to the crime. In 2017/18, the figure had grown to 8,525 offences (IICSA, 2020). The introduction of a new criminal offence of sexual communication with a child led to a 400 per cent rise in recorded sexual grooming offences; 1,156 in 2016-17 to 5,789 in 2019 (ONS 2020c).

2.3 ORGANISED CRIME

Key points:

- Organised crime groups are becoming more sophisticated and presenting a more complex policing challenge.
- The police recorded more than 5,000 modern slavery and human trafficking (MSHT) offences in 2018/19, with over 7,000 potential victims, from 130 countries.
- The rise of the County Lines model for trafficking drugs has been linked to recent increases in serious violence and robbery.
- Police recorded vehicle offences have been rising since March 2015 and much of this is thought by the NCA to be linked to organised crime.
- Globalisation, the growth of the drugs market and new technologies, as well as changing law enforcement practices, have led many organised crime groups to move into profitable “white collar” activities such as money laundering and fraud.

Organised crime is not new, but the evidence is that organised crime groups are diversifying their operations beyond their traditional revenue sources, such as the drugs trade, and are developing new ways to exploit people, harm the economy and damage communities.

Organised crime impacts in ways that are not always apparent to the public (Gottschalk, 2009; Crocker et al, 2017). The NCA estimates that serious and organised crime costs the UK economy well in excess of £37 billion a year and affects – and kills – more people than any other threat to national security (NCA, 2020). With more than 4,700 organised crime groups made up of over 50,000 associated individuals operating in the UK, the threat is assessed by the NCA to be growing in scale and impacting on an increasingly wide range of victims.

There is also evidence that organised crime groups are diversifying their operations, becoming involved in more types of crime and are collaborating in more fluid ways, including internationally. They are also making

increasingly sophisticated use of technology to trade criminal commodities via the dark web, launder profits through virtual currencies and conceal communications using encryption technology (NCA, 2019a, 2020).

The NCA identifies technology, border vulnerabilities, UK corruption and financial flows as key cross-cutting enablers of organised crime. In our Call for Evidence submissions and interviews, well-placed police and law enforcement respondents frequently identified organised crime as a major and evolving public safety challenge and a significant generator of direct and indirect police demand.

In what follows, we examine the recent evolution of organised crime in England and Wales, focusing on the involvement of organised crime groups in MSHT, drugs, organised acquisitive crime and money laundering.

2.3.1 Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking

Modern slavery and human trafficking (MSHT) involves profiting from prostitution, forced labour (notably within criminal enterprises) and, less often in the UK context, through organ harvesting and domestic servitude (although the latter is believed to be significantly under-reported in the UK) (NCA, 2019a, 2020). Reflecting the substantial and prolonged impact on victims, these are considered by the government to be the second most costly crimes to society, per offence, behind only homicide (Home Office, 2019a).

The police recorded more than 5,000 MSHT offences in 2018/19 (Home Office, 2019a), with over 7,000 potential victims, from 130 countries, identified through the National Referral Mechanism during 2019 (NCA, 2020). Although these figures represent an increase on previous years, this is believed to reflect growing awareness and law enforcement activity. The scale of offending is much greater than official figures suggest, with one estimate suggesting there are as many as 136,000 victims annually in the UK (Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner, 2019).


2.3.2 Drugs

The self-reported use of **illegal drugs** in England and Wales has reduced over the last two decades, largely driven by falling cannabis consumption. However, the proportion of people who report using Class A drugs, and cocaine in particular, has increased (Figure 2.7) (Home Office, 2019b).

There is also evidence that use of some of the most addictive drugs has been rising. The estimated number of opiate and crack cocaine users in England rose 4.4 percent between 2014/15 and 2016/17, and there is a particular concern about the growing number who use crack on its own (O'Connor, 2019). Recorded deaths linked to drug misuse rose 78 per cent between 2012 and 2018 (ONS, 2019a) and hospital admissions for drug related mental and behavioural disorders in England have more than doubled in a decade (NHS

Figure 2.7 Proportion of 16 to 59-year-olds reporting use of drugs in the last year (%)

Source: Home Office, 2019b



Digital, 2019a). While the overall numbers entering drug treatment programmes have reduced, the numbers principally presenting for crack, heroin or powder cocaine misuse (separately or in combination) have gone up (PHE, 2019).

These shifting patterns of drug use have been linked to structural changes in cocaine production and supply (Hales et al, 2020). Increased coca bush cultivation in Colombia (UNODC, 2019a), greater supply-chain control by organised crime groups across Latin American source and transit countries (NCA, 2020), and the increased dominance of Albanian importers (Hales et al, 2020), have combined to drive up the availability and purity of domestic powder and crack cocaine supply, pushing retail prices down and increasing the number of dependent users. Heroin purity levels are currently also at a 10-year high (NCA, 2020).

In response to these changing market conditions, some of the 1,716 organised crime groups involved in organised drug supply in the UK (NCA, 2020), have sought to expand geographically, away from saturated urban retail markets, including by adopting

the County Lines distribution model. This involves the supply of drugs, principally crack cocaine and heroin, by city-based networks and organised crime groups, into smaller towns and rural areas, and the use of dedicated, branded mobile phone “deal lines” to take orders and arrange delivery. More than 3,000 such lines were identified in 2019, with 800 to 1,100 believed active at any one time (NCA, 2020).

The County Lines model relies on the exploitation of young people to move consignments of drugs, make deliveries, collect payment and carry out other related criminal activities. They might threaten a young person or their family, or else offer rewards such as money, food, alcohol, clothes and jewellery, or improved status – but in such a way that the child feels in debt to their exploiter (Stone, 2018). Vulnerable adults are also sometimes exploited, for example through the “cuckooing” of accommodation for use in drugs activity (NCA, 2019b). Due to the increased availability and aggressive marketing tactics used in new territories, Class A consumption appears to have grown more rapidly away from urban markets (Hales et al, 2020, O’Connor, 2019).

Box 2.1 Serious and weapon enabled violence

In recent years we have seen an increase in serious and weapon enabled violence, (NCA, 2019b, NCA 2020, Hales et al, 2020), which has become one of the most pressing and high-profile policing and public safety challenges facing the country.

Overall, the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) shows that levels of violence have fallen significantly since the peak of crime in 1995, from an estimated 4.5 million incidents in 1995 to less than 1.25 million in 2019 (Figure 2.8).

Figure 2.8 Trends in CSEW incidents of violence, y/e December 1981 to December 2019

Source: ONS, 2020a





Figure 2.9 Trends in police recorded violence involving knives and NHS finished consultant episodes for assault with sharp object

Source: ONS, 2020a and NHS Digital, 2019b



However, police crime records (ONS, 2020a) and NHS data (NHS Digital, 2019b), show a marked increase in levels of serious violence, particularly violence involving knives, since 2015 (Figure 2.9). Knife homicides, most notably of younger male victims (Figure 2.10), have also increased over the same period.

The year ending March 2019 saw 6,759 non-air firearm offences, the highest number since 2010/11 and an increase of 39 per cent since 2014/15. Organised crime groups are known to use firearms in feuds with other criminal groups or to protect their enterprises (NCA, 2020).

Figure 2.10 Homicides by sharp instrument by age and sex of victim

Source: ONS, 2020d





Figure 2.11 Number and proportion of drug related homicides, March 2009 to March 2019

Source: ONS, 2020d



Although many factors are involved, there is good evidence to suggest that the recent rise in serious violence is linked to drug market volatility, specifically the conflict generated by gangs and organised crime groups as they compete for dominance in increasingly saturated markets and seek to establish control of new territory (NCA 2020, Hales et al, 2020).

The link between drug market dynamics and spikes in serious violence is well-documented internationally (for a recent summary see Morgan et al., 2020). For example, in the United States, the expansion in illicit drug markets brought about by the heroin and synthetic opioid epidemic in 2015 coincided with an increase of 20 per cent on the previous year in drug related homicides compared to a smaller five per cent rise in other felony murders (HM Government, 2018a).

The timing and locations of recent increases in England and Wales is consistent with the hypothesis that County Lines activity is a significant driver of serious violence. For instance, although continuing to concentrate in urban areas, knife crime and robberies have increased fastest in more rural police force areas (Hales et al., 2020), and the number and proportion of homicides identified as being “drug related” have also all increased (ONS, 2020d). Drug related violence has been identified as the single biggest cause of the rise in homicides in England and Wales since 2014 (Morgan et al, 2020) (Figure 2.11) and can be linked to previous short, sharp increases such as during the crack epidemic in the US in the 1980s.

In England and Wales, some non-urban forces have expressed concerns about increasing firearm use related to County Lines; a recent report indicated that 118 of these lines had links to firearms (NCA, 2019b).

The market for new psychoactive substances (NPS), such as the synthetic cannabinoid spice, methamphetamine and fentanyl, also appears to be expanding. There were 2,973 seizures of NPS in 2018/19, an increase of 25 per cent since 2017/18, the first year the data was recorded (Home Office, 2019c). The NCA also reported increased importation of chemicals required to manufacture these drugs (NCA, 2019a).

The increased popularity of these drugs among organised crime groups lies in the fact that they are more potent than their organic equivalents, meaning that they are easier to smuggle as “a few grams of

a substance, easily hidden in an envelope, can be sufficient to make many thousands of doses for the drug market”. The potency of these drugs, and the fact they vary in strength also poses an increased danger to life as it is easy to overdose on them (Europol, 2019). However, the use of these drugs has been stable over several years, after declines when their production and sale was criminalised in 2016 (Home Office, 2019b).

2.3.3 Organised acquisitive crime

In December 2019, there were estimated to be 468 organised crime groups involved in organised acquisitive crime in the UK, with groups exploiting the


Box 2.2 Robbery

As Figure 2.12 shows, the number of robberies committed has risen sharply in the past four years, increasing by 12 per cent in the year ending December 2019 compared with the previous year, to 83,930 offences (ONS, 2020a). While 60 per cent of robberies take place in urban forces such as the Metropolitan Police, Greater Manchester Police and West Midlands Police, the greatest increase is happening in rural areas, where between the year ending June 2015 and the year ending June 2019 robberies in Suffolk increased by 180 per cent and robberies in Dyfed-Powys increased by 135 per cent.

There are links between drug use and supply and robbery. Submissions to our Call for Evidence stated that a substantial amount of burglary, theft, shoplifting and robbery is committed by people who use heroin, crack cocaine or powder cocaine regularly. One study revealed that 89 per cent of robberies committed by a sample of arrested suspects were by current or former gang members, who were also likely to be involved in drug supply offences (HM Government, 2018a).

Figure 2.12 CSEW and police recorded robbery trends.

Source: ONS, 2019a



significant profits to be made from stealing property, including vehicles and mobile telephones (NCA, 2020).

There is a particular concern about organised vehicle theft. Police recorded vehicle offences have been rising since March 2015 (ONS, 2020a). According to the NCA, over half of the vehicles stolen are not recovered, which suggests these offences are highly likely to be organised, involving the rapid concealment and disposal of the vehicle (NCA, 2020).

The NCA reports that thieves are more likely than previously to use force on victims who try to prevent them stealing car keys (NCA, 2020). There was concern among respondents to our Call for Evidence that the “*focus (by the police) on vulnerability*” meant that emerging acquisitive crime patterns such as these were not being recognised and properly tackled.

2.3.4 Money laundering

Globalisation, the growth of the drugs market and new technologies, as well as changing law enforcement practices, have led many organised crime groups not only to diversify their tactics but to move away from traditional robbery and violence into more profitable and less risky “white collar” activities, such as money laundering and fraud (Harding et al, 2019).

In order to hide the illegal assets generated by fraud (discussed above), many organised crime groups turn to money laundering, which allows them to further their operations and conceal their assets. The UN estimates that two to five per cent of global GDP is laundered, and London’s position as one of the world’s largest financial centres means that the scale of UK based money laundering is in the hundreds of billions of pounds annually (NCA, 2020).

In 2017, Transparency International UK identified 766 UK companies being used in 52 corruption and money

laundering scandals amounting to more than £80 billion. In 2019, it identified 929 UK companies involved in 89 cases of corruption and money laundering, amounting to £137 billion in economic damage (Goodrich et al, 2019).

2.4 VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL ABUSE IN THE HOME OR OTHER PRIVATE SETTINGS

Key points:

- There was a 77 per cent increase in reported domestic abuse crime between 2016 and 2019.
- Police recorded stalking and harassment increased by 792 per cent between 2012 and 2019.
- The number of rapes reported to the police increased by 260 per cent 2013 and 2019.
- Police recorded child sexual abuse (CSA) offences increased by 204 per cent between 2012/13 and 2017/18.

In recent years there has been a major increase in reporting of violence and sexual abuse that takes place in homes or other private settings. This follows decades of campaigning by groups calling attention to the lack of seriousness with which the criminal justice system took sexual crime and domestic abuse of which women are overwhelmingly the victims. Most recently the Jimmy Savile scandal brought into focus the abuse of children in homes and institutional settings such as hospitals, care homes, schools and sports clubs.⁷

Taken together with the fall in traditional volume crime described above, this means that the focus of police work has shifted in recent years from the public street and into the previously neglected worlds of the private home and the closed institution.

2.4.1 Domestic abuse

Most violence experienced by women is perpetrated by a current or former intimate partner or another family member. This is shown by the violence against the person data from the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) in the years 2009 to 2019. For female victims, the offender was an intimate partner in 35 per cent of cases and another family member in 18 per cent of cases (compared to 14 per cent and 15 per cent in cases where the victim was male).

The CSEW reports a gradual downward trend in the rates of domestic violence against women over the last fifteen years from 2.7 million offences in March 2005 to 2.1 million offences in March 2019 (ONS, 2019b).⁸ However, at the same time, we have seen increased reporting of domestic abuse, which is thought to be linked to increased confidence among victims that the criminal justice system will take cases seriously (Holder, 2001; Keeling et al, 2015). As Figure 2.13 shows, there has been a 77 per cent increase in all reported domestic violence and other domestic abuse crime between 2016 and 2019.

The most common form of abuse suffered by women is emotional abuse, with 94 per cent of victims reporting this type of abuse in 2019 (Women's Aid, 2019). Almost a quarter of abuse suffered by victims is classified as coercive control (Myhill, 2018). Research shows that experiencing coercive control raised the odds of having experienced more than five physical assaults in the past year by more than six times (Myhill, 2018).

Almost half of domestic violence victims report more than one incident within a 12-month period, and 85 per cent of domestic violence crimes are repeat crimes. However, research suggests that the most serious offences are highly concentrated among a smaller group of perpetrators. A study in the Thames Valley Police area found that, looking at the estimated harm caused to victims by the offences, 90 per cent of total intimate partner abuse crime harm was inflicted by three per cent of the perpetrators (Barnham et al, 2017).

2.4.2 Stalking and harassment

Police recorded stalking and harassment increased by 792 per cent between 2012 and 2019 (Figure 2.14). Much of this increase is likely to be due to the creation of new stalking offences in 2012 alongside improved confidence among victims.


The majority of stalking perpetrators are men, with women being involved in between 10 per cent and 25 per cent of cases (Sheridan et al, 2016). Nearly half of stalking cases involve a couple who have previously been in a relationship (Quinn-Evans et al, 2019). Most stalking perpetrators are motivated by a desire to restore the relationship or to initiate a new relationship (Nijdam-Jones et al, 2018).

7 We should note that we are only describing part of the overall pattern of CSA here and that CSA takes place in public settings as well.

8 We should note that these figures may mask repeat offending. The Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) caps the number of repeat offences and when this cap is removed, the incidences of violence in the survey increases, and this is particularly true in cases of domestic violence (see Walby et al 2014)

Figure 2.13 Police recorded domestic abuse: violence, other crime and incidents.

Source: ONS, 2019c



2.4.3 Rape and sexual assault

25 per cent of women have experienced sexual assault in their lifetimes, compared to 4.5 per cent of men (ONS, 2020a). According to the CSEW in the years 2016 to 2018 700,000 people had been a victim of sexual assault in the last year, of whom 80 per cent were women (ONS, 2018).

The most common type of sexual assault was unwanted touching experienced by 400,000 women and 100,000 men (Figure 2.15). Between 2014 and 2016, an estimated 205,000 people were victims of rape or assault by penetration (including attempts), 88 per cent of whom were women (ONS, 2018). Fewer than one in five victims of rape or assault by penetration reported the offence to the police (ONS, 2018).

Figure 2.14 Police recorded stalking and harassment from March 2003 to March 2019.

Source ONS, 2019a





Figure 2.15 Sexual offences 2016-2018 (percentage of adults aged 16-59)

Source: ONS, 2018




In recent years, there has been a major increase in the number of victims reporting sexual offences to the police. For rape, this figure increased from 16,374 to 58,947 between March 2013 and June 2019, a 260 per cent increase. For other sexual assault this figure increased from 37,225 to 104,129 in the same period (Figure 2.16) (ONS, 2019b). The launch of Operation Yewtree in 2012 and the birth of the #MeToo movement

in 2017 are believed to have contributed to this huge rise in reporting as the authorities have encouraged victims to come forward (Guardian, 2019).

Following Operation Yewtree, there was also an increase in the reporting of non-recent sexual offences. In London, for example, such non recent reports increased by 134 per cent between March 2013 and March 2018 (MOPAC, 2019).

Figure 2.16 CSEW sexual assault and police recorded rape and sexual assault from March 2005 to March 2019

Source: ONS, 2019b



However, according to the End Violence against Women Coalition, while rapes reported to the police have increased, the number of cases charged and sent to court fell by 44 per cent between 2014 and 2018 (Waxman, 2019). Of the 58,657 allegations of rape reported in the year ending March 2019, only 1.7 per cent (1,925) resulted in a successful prosecution (HMCPSI, 2019).

One of our interviewees told us that charge rates are “falling through the floor”. This exposes problems within the criminal justice system but may also be damaging victims’ confidence in the police.

Some police forces report that the increase in reporting has posed considerable resource challenges. One police force criminal investigation department spoken to as part of this Review reported that most of their case load was made up of rape cases, and this is not thought to be uncommon.

2.4.4 Physical and sexual abuse of children

Child abuse and neglect includes “all forms of physical and emotional ill-treatment, sexual abuse, neglect, and exploitation that results in actual or potential harm to the child’s health, development or dignity” (WHO, 2017). It is estimated that approximately 8.5 million adults (20.7 per cent of the population) experienced abuse before the age of 16 years, one in 100 experienced neglect and an estimated 3.1 million adults were victims of sexual abuse as children (ONS, 2020e).

One in four women are victims of some form of abuse in childhood as opposed to one in six men. However, it is impossible to know if these estimates are accurate as many cases of child abuse remain unreported due to victims’ embarrassment, fear of humiliation or concern that they will not be believed (ONS, 2020e).

Around one in seven adults who called the National Association for People Abused in Childhood’s (NAPAC) helpline had not told anyone about their abuse before (ONS, 2020f) and on average they wait 26 years before disclosing (APPG, 2020). According to Home Office data, 34 per cent of police recorded sexual offences against children in the year ending March 2019 occurred one year or more before (ONS, 2020e).

NSPCC research shows that police recorded child sexual abuse (CSA) offences have risen from 18,755 in England and Wales in 2012/13 to 56,951 in 2017/18, a 204 per cent increase (NSPCC, 2019).

Only four per cent of child abuse reports made to the police end in a charge or summons and this is due to the difficulty in collecting evidence especially in non-recent cases (ONS, 2020f). One police force told us of the pressures of investigating non recent offending, which is more complex to investigate, and the need to balance it with cases where there is a live safeguarding risk, especially given the current shortage of specialist detectives.

While two thirds of CSA is believed to occur within family settings, over the last 10 years predatory grooming and sexual exploitation by groups of offenders has been uncovered in Rotherham (Jay, 2014), Rochdale, Oxford and other towns (NCA, 2019). Although some of this takes abuse place ‘behind closed doors’, some of it takes place in public settings.

Although much of this activity is hidden, some understanding of these groups can be gained by looking at police intelligence data (see Box 2.3).

Box 2.3 Organised Child Sexual Abuse in Bristol – a case study

In a 2016 Police Foundation study of CSA in Bristol, we found that more than half of the offenders identified in police intelligence data were operating as part of a group. In Bristol alone, 43 groups were identified with an average of five perpetrators in each. Some groups were familial, but most operated as loose networks of associates, often from the same ethnic background. Local practitioners told us that the problem was much more widespread than represented in police data, which tended to focus on groups known to be operating in areas like drugs supply.

From police data we can however understand more about how these groups operate:

- 11 of the 43 groups were linked to drug dealing.
- Perpetrators often enticed children to attend premises with inducements of drugs and alcohol.
- Six of the 43 groups criminally exploited young people such as using them to carry or deal drugs.
- Some individuals were making financial gains by coordinating the exploitation.
- Two thirds of the victims had not reported the abuse but had been flagged as a likely victim by local agencies.
- Many of the children at risk were from disadvantaged backgrounds, including having been abused or neglected at home or had been in the care system.

Source: Skidmore et al 2016.

2.5 PRECARIOUS LIVES

Key points:

- Non-crime incidents account for 84 per cent of all command and control calls.
- There was a 28 per cent increase in incidents flagged as mental health related between 2014 and 2018 across 36 police forces.
- Missing persons incidents reported to the police increased by 46 per cent between 2013/14 and 2016/17.

In recent years there has been a marked shift in demand on the police towards “public safety and concern for welfare” incidents. The College of Policing noted in 2015 that “*Non-crime incidents account for 84% of all command and control calls. Local police data suggests in some forces, ‘public safety and concern for welfare’ incidents now represent the largest category of recorded incidents. As with crimes that related to vulnerability, public protection and safeguarding, these incidents are likely to consume more resource effort as they can be more complex, many involving combined agency responses*” (College of Policing, 2015).

This section describes two areas of demand on the police that have increased significantly in recent years which involve people who suffer from multiple

disadvantages: incidents involving people with mental health problems and missing persons cases.

2.5.1 Mental health

Suffering from poor mental health increases the likelihood of someone coming into contact with the police either as a victim or because their behaviour can be perceived as being a risk to others (HMICFRS, 2018). Responding to such cases is complex because poor mental health also tends to be linked to other needs (Bramley et al, 2015).

Police powers under section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 enable them to detain and remove to a place of safety anyone they perceive to be suffering from mental disorder and to be in immediate need of care or control. There is no national data on the numbers of calls for service which are related to mental health incidents and force data is also patchy due to poor flagging and recording.

A survey of 36 forces by the BBC shows a 28 per cent increase in incidents flagged as mental health related between 2014 and 2018 across 26 forces (Figure 2.17).

Figure 2.18 shows that police use of their powers to detain a person under Section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 have increased by 26 per cent in the last two years.

Figure 2.17 Police flagged mental health incidents

Source: Jones, 2019: 36 forces





Figure 2.18 Police use of s.136 in England and Wales.

Source: Home Office, 2019d



This increase in the number of people with mental health problems that the police come across has been attributed to a number of causes, from reductions in funding for mental health services, leading to fewer beds and less out-of-hours support, to greater reporting due to increased awareness among members of the public and better understanding and recording of mental health incidents by the police (HMICFRS, 2018).

There is evidence that NHS mental health services are under significant strain, particularly in crisis care: data from 39 mental health trusts showed that 70 per cent reported a workload increase in 2016/17, and one trust had seen a 60 per cent rise in crisis referrals. In August 2017, it was reported that the amount of paramedics' time spent supporting people with their mental health rose by 32 per cent nationally and by 45 per cent in London (Home Affairs Committee, 2018).

Respondents to our Call for Evidence indicated that austerity was widely blamed for this crisis. We were told by one police source that lack of funding for early intervention means that *"people aren't getting the minor problems prevented, getting worse and then we're dealing when they're badly suffering"*.

This kind of work can take up a lot of police time. Due to a change in government policy, the police are supposed to take detainees to a health-based place of safety rather than hold them in police custody. However, a shortage of beds and spaces in 136 suites in hospitals mean that police officers are having to wait with patients, sometimes for hours, before a mental health professional can take over (Home Affairs Committee, 2018). According to one force responding

to our Call for Evidence, the average wait for an ambulance in their area is 80 minutes, which means in 41 per cent of cases police officers end up taking patients to the place of safety, and then they wait an average of three hours for a medical practitioner to take over.

2.5.2 Missing People


In 2017 the College of Policing published Authorised Professional Practice (APP) on Missing Persons which defines a missing person as: *"anyone whose whereabouts cannot be established will be considered as missing until they have been located, and their well-being or otherwise confirmed."*

Police devote upwards of three million 'investigation hours' per year to missing persons reports in England and Wales. The average cost per investigation can range from £1,870 to £2,415, and the total annual cost of these investigations is estimated between £394 million and £509 million (Babuta and Sidebottom, 2018).

According to the latest National Crime Agency (NCA) figures, there were 196,560 missing incidents recorded by the police in 2013/14, which had increased to 286,763 by 2016/17, a rise of 46 per cent (Figure 2.19). In London, Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) officers deal with 126 missing persons a day on average and, in South Wales, a person is reported missing every 45 minutes. In Avon and Somerset, missing people make up 19 per cent of police demand, while West Yorkshire has seen a 287 per cent rise in cases over the last five years.

Figure 2.19 Missing related calls and missing incidents between 2012/13 and 2016/17

Source: NCA, 2019c



The charity, Missing People, explains that the number of missing incidents is higher than the number of individuals who go missing because some people go missing more than once. Nearly 60 per cent of missing person incidents involving children are repeat missing episodes involving the same child, while 20 per cent of adult incidents are repeat episodes.

In terms of the impact of these incidents, according to the police data, of the 112,853 missing child incidents in 2014/15, in 98 per cent of cases the child returned unharmed, in 1.6 per cent of cases they were hurt or harmed, in 0.3 per cent of cases they suffered a sexual offence and in less than 0.1 per cent of cases they were found dead (NCA, 2016). However, other data suggests that as many as 11 per cent of missing children return hurt or harmed, but may not report it to the police either because of mistrust or because they might not realise they have been harmed (Babuta and Sidebottom, 2018).

There are a number of reasons for the rise in missing persons reports. One is pressure on mental health services, with eight in ten adults going missing because of diagnosed or undiagnosed mental health reasons (Home Affairs Committee, 2018, Holmes, 2017).

Children who are in residential or foster care are far more likely to go missing than those living in a family home, and are more likely to go missing on more than one occasion – nearly half of all young people in care go missing at least once compared to one in 10

of the general population (Babuta and Sidebottom, 2018). One respondent to our Call for Evidence argued that underinvestment in children's services has led to increased use of private, unregulated care homes in cheap areas miles away from family networks. This leaves children in these homes vulnerable to exploitation. Indeed, a large proportion of missing child incidents originate from a small number of problem addresses, which tend to be private care homes (Shalev Greene and Hayden, 2014).

According to one response to our Call for Evidence some children's services report they are at capacity, only managing to see half their caseload weekly, which may also contribute to the likelihood of children going missing.

In 2016/17, 63 per cent of missing incidents/ investigations were attributable to children in England and Wales. However, children are more likely to go missing more than once; of individuals recorded as missing in the same year, 55 per cent were adults (NCA, 2019c). While one in 200 children goes missing each year, one in 500 adults do too. Up to 8 in 10 missing adults have diagnosed or undiagnosed mental health issues, 3 in 10 go missing due to a relationship breakdown, while dementia is the reason for 1 in 10 missing adults. 4 of every 10 people with dementia will be reported missing at some point. Homelessness and abuse are also commonly reported causes of missing people (Missing people, 2018).

2.6 SOCIAL TENSION

Key points:

- The number of protest events has risen steadily over the last decade, going from 83 in 2007 to 280 in 2019.
- The number of protests involving confrontational tactics increased from 7 in 2000 to 126 in 2019.
- The number of hate crimes reported to the police rose by 144 per cent between 2012/13 and 2018/19
- 280 people were arrested for terrorism-related activity in 2019 and in the same year the number of white people arrested for such offences exceeded the number of Asian people, indicating a shift in the nature of the terrorist threat and in particular a growing threat from far-right groups.

Since the foundation of the police service in the 19th century, the police have always played a role in ensuring public order and managing the social tensions that exist in complex and unequal societies. This section explores how these tensions have manifested themselves in three areas in recent years: the policing of protest, hate crime and terrorism.

2.6.1 Policing protest

The right to peaceful protest is protected under the European Convention of Human Rights, and according to Authorised Professional Practice from the College of Policing, police “*must not prevent, hinder or restrict peaceful assembly*” except in rare circumstances.

The police must operate on the presumption that the protest will be peaceful, unless there is evidence to the contrary. Moreover, the police have a duty to “*take reasonable steps to protect those who want to exercise their rights peacefully*”.

The number of protest events has risen steadily over the last decade, going from 83 in 2007 to 280 in 2016.

While the vast majority of these protests have been peaceful, there has been a rise in more confrontational protest tactics. Figure 2.20 shows a dramatic spike in the number of confrontational protests, increasing from seven in 2000 to 126 in 2019. This is almost certainly linked to the Extinction Rebellion (ER) protests in 2018 and 2019 which actively promoted civil disobedience as a way of calling for stronger action on climate change.

2.6.2 Hate crime

Hate crime is defined as “*any criminal offence which is perceived by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by hostility or prejudice, based on a person’s disability or perceived disability; race or perceived race; or religion or perceived religion; or sexual orientation or perceived sexual orientation or transgender identity or perceived transgender identity*”. A hate crime can include verbal abuse, intimidation, threats, harassment, assault and bullying, as well as damage to property (CPS 2020).

The number of hate crimes reported to the police in England and Wales rose by 144 per cent between 2012/13 and 2018/19, when 103,379 hate crimes were recorded (Figure 2.21).

Figure 2.20 Frequency of types of protest action since 1985

Source: Bailey, 2020





Figure 2.21 Hate crimes recorded by the police, by monitored strand 2011/12 to 2018/19

Source: Home Office, 2019e



In 2019, over half of the hate crimes recorded by the police were for public order offences, and a further third were for violence against the person offences. There have been increases in numbers of offences across all hate crime categories (Home Office, 2019e).⁹

This increase is likely to reflect an increased willingness among victims to report, alongside a reduced tolerance for bigotry among society as a whole. As respondents to our Call for Evidence pointed out, it may also reflect an increase in incidences which take place via social media.

Just over half of religiously motivated hate crimes were targeted against Muslims and around 20 per cent were against Jews (Home Office, 2019e). While a lot of the increase in hate crime can be attributed to better reporting to police, there have been genuine spikes around incidents such as the EU Referendum and the terrorist attacks in 2017. For example, Tell MAMA, an organisation which supports victims of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate, recorded a 692 per cent spike in reports of anti-Muslim hatred and a 433 per cent increase in anti-Muslim attacks in the UK following the Christchurch Mosque shooting in New Zealand 2019. (Home Office, 2019e; Tell MAMA, 2020).

2.6.3 Terrorism

According to the Terrorism Act 2000, terrorism is defined as the use or threat of action where:

“the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.”

The action referred to includes serious violence against a person, serious damage to property, endangering of a person’s life, threat to public health or safety or disruption of an electronic system.


In total, 3,411 people have died as a result of terrorism since 1970. Most deaths between 1970 and 1990 were a result of the conflict in Northern Ireland. Since the Lockerbie bombing in Scotland, which killed 271 people in 1988, there has been a decline in the numbers of fatalities, apart from peaks in 2005 and 2017. Between April 2003 and March 2019, 92 people died in Great Britain as a direct result of terrorist attacks. Al Qaida claimed responsibility for the deaths of 56 people, including the four suicide bombers, during the London bombings of 7th July 2005, while, in 2017, 42 people were killed in Islamist terror attacks in London and Manchester (Allen and Kirk-Wade, 2020).

The latest available data from Europol’s European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report indicates that, in 2018, the UK had 60 foiled, failed and completed attacks which was the highest number reported by EU member states. The majority of these related to the situation in Northern Ireland. Of the rest, four were Jihadist, and all but one was foiled (Europol, 2018).

⁹ We should note here are concerns that religious hate crime is being misclassified as racial hate crime

Figure 2.22 Number of people arrested for terrorism offences

Source: Home Office (2020)




In the year ending December 2019, 280 people were arrested for terrorism-related activity, of which 87 were charged (Figure 2.22) (Home Office, 2020). As with other crime types, the majority of people arrested for terrorism related activity (89 per cent) were male. As in previous years, more than half of those arrested were 30 and over (Home Office, 2020).

There remains a serious threat from Islamist terrorists and also a growing one from far right groups. The year ending December 2019 was only the second time since 2004 in which the proportion of white people arrested exceeded the proportion of Asian people (Figure 2.23) (Home Office, 2020). The former head of MI5, Sir Andrew Parker, was quoted in the Financial Times

Figure 2.23 The ethnic appearance of persons arrested for terrorism-related activity (proportions).

Source: Home Office, 2020.



as saying that half of the terror attacks foiled in 2019 involved those on the far-right (Barber, 2020).

It is predicted that the demand on the police generated by terrorism, both right wing and Jihadist, will continue to increase, even if the number of attacks does not. The methodology and sophistication of terrorist plots are expected to continue to evolve and, according to police responses to our Call for Evidence, there will continue to be “*self-radicalising lone actor terrorists who can cause huge disruption with relatively small scale attacks*” often with little or no prior warning.

2.7 EMERGENCIES AND MAJOR DISRUPTION

Key points:

- There was a 14 per cent increase in the average number of climate and weather-related disasters occurring globally between 2005 and 2014, compared to 1995-2004;
- The 2015-2016 winter floods cost emergency services including police and fire and rescue £3 million;
- The ease of global travel and increases in population density have increased the risk of global pandemics.

The coronavirus pandemic has revealed how a major emergency, arriving quickly from the other side of the world, can very suddenly wreak havoc on this country’s health, welfare and economy. The pandemic has been exceptional in its impact and in the nature of the task it has imposed on policing: to encourage compliance with public health rules that have severely restricted civil liberties. Added to this is the fact that this has had to be done everywhere around the country, all at once, as opposed to most civil emergencies that are typically locally concentrated.¹⁰

According to the Peelian principles (see Box 5.1, chapter five), as well as preventing crime, police officers have a duty to serve the public through “*protecting and preserving life*”. These obligations on the police come to the fore at times of emergency, which is defined by the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 as an event or situation that threatens serious damage to human welfare, the environment or the security of the UK (Grimwood, 2017). Under the Act, an event is judged to threaten human welfare if it:

“causes or may cause loss of human life, human illness or injury, homelessness, damage to property, disruption of a supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel, disruption of a system of communication, disruption of facilities for transport, or disruption of services relating to health.”

This definition not only covers criminal acts such as terrorist acts, but also natural disasters such as floods and fires, large scale accidents such as plane crashes, train derailments and industrial accidents and global human and animal pandemics such as influenza, swine flu and the coronavirus pandemic (Brinser et al, 2016).

The specific role the police service must play during major incidents, in conjunction with other authorities, is set out in the NPCC’s Emergency Procedures Guidance (College of Policing, 2013). This is to prevent loss of life and escalation, coordinate the response phase of the incident among all of the different agencies, activate the local strategic coordination group (SCG) and coordinate the provision of information to the public, alongside standard police functions relating to investigating crime, managing traffic and so on.

Figure 2.28 lists the events that have been classed as major incidents in recent decades in this country. Although they range from accidents and natural disasters to terror attacks, all of them placed heavy demands on emergency services to “*work together effectively... to contain and respond to the crisis, protect the public and save lives*” (HMIC, 2016).

There are two areas that seem likely to generate greater demand in the years ahead: 1) incidents linked to climate change and 2) pandemics.

2.7.1 Incidents linked to climate change

More than a decade ago, an Australian police chief predicted that “*climate change is going to be the security issue of the 21st century*” (Keilty, M. 2007). Police forces across the world are expected to respond to natural disasters such as fires, hurricanes, floods, tornadoes, and ice storms (Brinser et al, 2016) arising out of rising sea levels, changing weather patterns and more extreme weather events. Although the police cannot themselves prevent such emergencies, they nevertheless play an important role not only in saving lives but to help build the resilience of communities to enable them to more effectively respond to such disasters (Mutongwizo et al, 2019).

10 The Police Foundation in partnership with Crest Advisory is currently working on a major new project on Policing the Pandemic, which will explore the impact of the pandemic on police demand, public attitudes to the police and police effectiveness and organisational resilience. The project will conclude in December 2020 and its findings will feed into the Strategic Review’s thinking ahead of our Phase Two report in June 2021.

Table 2.1 Date and location of headline UK major incidents.

Source: Bennett, 2018; Pitt, 2008; Hunter, 2019

Date	Incident	Number of deaths	Number hospitalised	Other information
1989	Hillsborough	96	766	
2002	Potters Bar	7	70	
2005	London Bombs	52	>700	
2007	UK Floods	13	7,000 rescued by emergency services	55,000 homes and businesses affected. Total cost £3.2bn
2009	H1N1 flu epidemic	392	28,456. 100 in ICU per week at peak	
2015-2016	Winter floods	3		20,925 homes and businesses effected. Total cost £1.6 billion
2017	Westminster Bridge attack	6	49 (15 critical)	
2017	Manchester Arena bomb attack	22	8002	
2017	London Bridge attack	8	48 (21 critical)	
2017	Grenfell Tower Fire	72	70	
2020	Coronavirus pandemic	41,969 (as of 16th June 2020)	118,526 (as of 13th June 2020)	

There are two areas that merit particular attention as they are likely to generate greater demand in the years ahead: 1) incidents linked to climate change and 2) major pandemics.

The number of disasters worldwide has risen dramatically in the past decade and is likely to continue. The United Nations has estimated that the direct losses from all disasters worldwide in the period 1998-2017 totalled \$2.9 trillion, which is 2.3 times as much as the overall losses of \$1.3 trillion in the period 1978-1997. A significant number of these were climate or weather-related disasters, with floods and storms accounting for nearly 90 per cent of the 7,255 major disasters between 1998 and 2017. Between 2005 and 2014 there was an average of 335 climate and weather-related disasters globally per year, which is an increase of 14 per cent compared to the period 1995-2004, and almost twice the level recorded during 1985-1995 (CRED and UNISDR, 2015).

For the UK, the National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies 2017 states that climate change is “not only a future challenge”, but one which is affecting the country now, with an average rise in temperatures of 1°C over the last century and sea levels rising 3mm annually, as well as changing patterns of rainfall (Cabinet Office, 2017). This increases the likelihood of extreme flooding, such as in summer 2007 which

claimed 13 lives, led to 7,000 people being evacuated by emergency services and cost the UK economy £3.2bn, or droughts such as that in 2003 which led to 2,000 deaths.

All of this, as the College of Policing recognises in a report on police demand, creates a “*potentially significant operational and financial risk for the Service*” (College of Policing, 2015). One respondent to our Call for Evidence stated that extra demand will be generated by the “*time and resource intensive*” process of developing local and national plans for a variety of scenarios in collaboration with other emergency services.

For example, the floods in 2007 burdened police forces with extra costs generated by staff overtime and the need for emergency supplies and provisions. Six police authorities reported costs above their normal operational costs and the total audited extra spend was £2.57 million, of which 60 per cent was not refunded (Chatterton et al, 2010). It is estimated that the 2015-2016 winter floods cost emergency services, including police and fire and rescue, an extra £3 million (Environment Agency, 2018).

2.7.2 Policing pandemics

In late December, Kent Police submitted a response to our Call for Evidence stating that police forces should expect to encounter and prepare for “*outbreaks of pandemic diseases that may be very challenging to control given modern global transport systems and freedom of movement*”. The respondent added that these have the potential to “*significantly destabilise large populations and thus civil tranquillity*”. These words were extraordinarily prescient as a few short months later the world found itself in the grip of the coronavirus pandemic.

As Policy Exchange states in its paper ‘Policing a Pandemic’, emergency planning teams have been preparing to combat a global pandemic since its inclusion as one of the most “*likely and impactful risks*” on the National Risk Register in 2008 (Walton and Falkner, 2020). The UK’s “*influenza pandemic preparedness strategy*”, originally published in 2011, sets out the role of the police during a severe pandemic. It anticipated that factors such as “*pressures on the health services, measures to control the spread of infection, possible shortages of basic necessities or short-lived disruption to essential services*” could “*threaten breakdowns in public order*” to which the police have a duty to respond (Department of Health, 2011).

Rather than using the Civil Contingencies Act, which allows for the provision for limited emergency regulations but dictates that they lapse after 30 days, the government passed the Coronavirus Act 2020 on 25 March. This placed the UK under lockdown and gave police the powers to assist health professionals to direct people to be tested for coronavirus and to enforce medical directions.

In addition, police officers were tasked with upholding the Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (England) Regulations 2020 enacted on 26 March. These stated that no person may leave the place they are living without a reasonable excuse and gave police powers to enforce this regulation, disperse groups and issue fines for noncompliance. In effect, people were only allowed to leave the house to shop for basic necessities, take exercise with members of the same household, for medical need or if they were unable to work from home, or had another reasonable excuse (Home Affairs Committee, 2020). Police officers

were instructed to use their discretion and respond in line with the four ‘E’s – Engage, Explain, Encourage, Enforce (NPCC and College of Policing, 2020).

However, there have been challenges for the police in responding to this event and concerns raised about the response. For example, confusion arose when the government issued non-enforceable guidance around measures such as keeping two metres apart and the distance one can travel from home. Some forces initially closed roads, set up road blocks and declared parts of the countryside closed. Some forces issued hundreds of enforcement notices during the first weekend the new laws were in place, while others issued none. This led to accusations of inconsistency and concerns that police were enforcing government advice rather than the letter of the law (Home Affairs Committee, 2020; Chakelian, 2020).

Some chief officers expressed discomfort at the enforcement measures with Shaun Sawyer of Devon and Cornwall Police telling the Guardian: “*It is confusing, it is frustrating. It’s like you have to regulate every aspect of people’s lives ... I am concerned if we don’t land this correctly it affects relationships with the public in the future*” (Dodd, 2020). Fresh guidance was published by the NPCC and the College of Policing and an intensive training programme was created to improve consistency across forces (Home Affairs Committee, 2020).

There has also been evidence of disproportionality in the issuing of fines, with black and Asian people more likely to be issued with fines and arrest under the coronavirus legislation (Busby and Gidda, 2020).

It is too early to say what effect this latest national emergency will have on relations between the public and police, nor what lessons can be learned for the future. The Police Foundation and Crest Advisory are currently conducting research into the police response to the pandemic which will be published in December 2020 and the findings will feed into the final report of this Strategic Review. It is clear that, given the ease of global travel and increases in population density around the world, the risk of global pandemics will remain with us (Ministry of Defence, 2018). The police, as with all other public services, will need to learn lessons from the coronavirus pandemic in order to strengthen their capability to manage such crises in the years ahead.

2.8 CONCLUSION

This chapter has described how the forms of threat, harm and risk faced by citizens in England and Wales have been transformed since the turn of the millennium. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, public attention was focused on traditional volume crime, such as burglary and car theft. Tackling antisocial behaviour was a major, and politically defining, focus of government policy.

20 years on, the public safety challenges facing the country look radically different and the implications for policing are considerable. Volume acquisitive crime has fallen substantially. The most common form of crime is now (largely cyber enabled) fraud, a type of crime which goes mainly unreported and of that which is reported, most of it is not investigated by the police.

There have been major increases in the reporting of crimes that 30 years ago were not seen as a core part of police work, including domestic abuse, child sexual abuse and sexual assault. These cases now dominate the work of police investigation departments, but they are struggling to cope with the increased levels of complex investigative demand.

The police are responding to increasing numbers of incidents involving people facing multiple disadvantages. In these cases, the police have increasingly found themselves wrestling with the tension between their tasks of law enforcement and of safeguarding those who need help and protection. These cases also highlight the way in which the police have to operate as part of a wider system of actors in order to solve problems, protect people and repair breaches in the social fabric.

The police have also been tested as social tensions have required management and sometimes enforcement and as major emergencies have demanded the rapid mobilisation of resources.

Overall, the changes described demonstrate how broad in scope the challenge of providing public safety has now become, and how varied and complex are its component parts. It is hard to imagine how policing, with its limited resources and as traditionally configured, will be able to meet these demands fully or even adequately on its own. This means, as we move into Phase Two of this Review, we need to ask fundamental questions about what we want the police to do, how they should operate as part of a wider system of actors and what skills and competencies they require to contribute successfully to public safety in the 2020s and beyond.

3. THE PUBLIC SECURITY CHALLENGE

In the last chapter we discussed the objective threats and risks we face as a country and how these have evolved in recent years. In this chapter we turn to the more subjective aspects of security. As Professor Ian Loader writes in an Insight Paper published to inform this Review:

'Public security is not just a matter of safety. Rather, it results from a combination of people's antecedent level of objective risk and the trust they have in the measures put in place to deal with such risks. Security, in this sense, is a product of the resources people have for managing unease and uncertainty something that very much depends on their attachment to – and confident, effortless membership of – a political community' (Loader 2020).

How people experience crime and safety is important. If people feel unsafe then this is likely to have a major impact on their wellbeing and is therefore a legitimate and important focus of public policy.

In this chapter we explore these more subjective aspects of security by looking, first, at people's levels of concern about crime and how these have changed in recent years, and second, at how people view the police. This latter point is important. How people experience policing and the messages this conveys about their membership of society is an important contributor to how safe and secure they feel.

3.1 PUBLIC CONCERN ABOUT CRIME

Key points:

- Crime has been rising as a public concern since 2015 and in 2019 was rated by 20 per cent of people as one of the top issues facing Britain;
- Those who live in deprived areas are up to five time more likely to be fearful of violent crime;
- Those on the lowest incomes are 62 per cent more likely to experience personal crime and 73 per cent more likely to experience violent crime;
- 27 per cent of non-white people perceive that they are very or fairly likely to become victim of crime compared to 18 per cent of white people.

Ipsos MORI regularly ask the public what they see as the most important issues facing the country. In January 2020, before the coronavirus pandemic, 20 per cent of the public cited 'crime/law and order/antisocial behaviour' as one of the top issues facing Britain today. Of greater concern were Brexit, healthcare, climate change and poverty and inequality. However, crime has been rising as a public concern since 2015 and in 2019 reached the same level of salience in the Ipsos MORI Issues Index as during the August 2011 riots (Figure 3.1).

Figure. 3.1 Ipsos Mori Issues Index: How the public see Crime/Law and Order/Anti-Social Behaviour as an issue facing the country

Source: Ipsos MORI, 2020





Figure 3.2 Public perception of crime. Percentage saying crime has gone up ‘a little’ or ‘a lot’ in the past few years

Source: ONS, 2019b



This increase in the public salience of crime is most likely linked to the fact that more people think crime is going up. Figure 3.2 shows that there has been an increase since 2015 in the numbers of people who believe that crime is getting worse locally and nationally.

These figures are at odds with the findings from the CSEW which show that overall crime has continued to go down or stayed broadly flat in recent years. We should note that these perceptions also seem to be at odds with people’s perceptions of the likelihood that they themselves will become a victim of violence, car theft and burglary. Perceived likelihood of victimisation of those common crime types has declined steadily since the mid-1990s.

One reason for the apparent tension between a perception of rising crime and a broadly flat overall crime rate may be the rise in serious violent crime in recent years, which has received substantial attention in the news media. Such serious incidents affect relatively small numbers of people directly but because of their seriousness receive substantial coverage in the media.

Indeed, according to work by the ONS, perceptions of whether crime is rising locally are gleaned mainly from direct personal experience, the experiences of friends

and relatives, word of mouth and local newspapers. By contrast people who believe crime is rising nationally tend to get this information from the news media (Figure 3.3).

Fear of crime is not experienced equally. Those on low incomes worry significantly more about car theft, race attacks, robbery, being attacked, burglary, rape, online crime and identity theft than those on high incomes (Cuthbertson, 2018). Figure 3.4 shows that those who live in social housing are more likely to fear violent crime than those who rent privately or own their own home. Those who live in deprived areas are up to five times more likely to be fearful of violent crime, as are those on low incomes.

Indeed, turning to actual victimisation rates, they are right to be more fearful. Cuthbertson (2018) shows that those on the lowest incomes are 62 per cent more likely to experience personal crime and 73 per cent more likely to experience violent crime. Domestic violence, arson, household theft, burglary (and attempted), bicycle theft, wounding, robbery and violence with injury are all between two and three times more likely in the 20 per cent most deprived areas. Figure 3.5 shows the inequality in victimisation rates for personal crime in the CSEW data.

Figure 3.3 Percentage of adults who thought crime had been rising either locally or nationally by the sources they felt had informed their opinions

Source: ONS 2017a




Figure 3.4 Percentage of CSEW respondents saying they worry about violent crime

Source ONS, 2019b





Figure 3.5 Percentage of adult CSEW respondents who were victims of personal crime

ONS 2019b



As one of the respondents to our Call for Evidence states: *'Crime [is] manifesting in locations of high deprivation. The latest figures outlining the localities across the UK experiencing several forms of deprivation (educational, medical, financial) distinctly correlate with high crime areas, continuing the cyclical process of generational crime.'*

Fear of crime is also unequally felt among different ethnic groups, which may of course be linked to the differences between socio-economic groups described above (see Figure 3.6). 24 per cent of Asian people, 19 per cent of black people, 16 per cent of people of mixed ethnicity and 22 per cent of people from 'other' ethnic groups report high levels of worry about violent crime, compared to 8 per cent of white people.

Similarly, for burglary, 23 per cent of Asian people, 13 per cent of black people, 13 per cent of people of mixed ethnicity and 14 per cent of people from 'other'

ethnic groups have high levels of worry about burglary, compared to eight per cent of white people.

For car crime, 15 per cent of Asian people, nine per cent of black people, 12 per cent of people of mixed ethnicity and 12 per cent of people from 'other' ethnic groups report high levels of worry about car crime, compared to six per cent of white people (ONS, 2019b).

Throughout England and Wales, the perceived likelihood of victimisation being 'very likely' or 'fairly likely' between March 2014 and March 2016 was 18 per cent for white people and 27 per cent for non-white people (ONS, 2017b).

There are also marked gender differences in the fear of crime. 15 per cent of women have high levels of worry about violent crime, compared to just four per cent of men. Women also report higher levels of worry about burglary and car crime than men (ONS, 2019b).

3.2 TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE POLICE

Key points:

- 75 per cent of people express overall confidence in their local police.
- 76 per cent of people say they trust the police.
- Public ratings of the police have declined in the last year.
- Black Caribbean people have 19 per cent less overall confidence in the police compared to white people.
- These figures are likely to reflect persistent racial disproportionalities in the use of police powers, with black people being 3.5 times more likely to be arrested and 9.5 times more likely to be stopped and searched than white people.

How people perceive the police is an important source of public security. As Loader, 2020 describes:

“The capacity of all affected by harm or disorder to summon the police when they are threatened or violated and have the police come to their aid without fear or favour, is a significant, hard won and fragile historical achievement, as well as a telling indicator of social solidarity....”

Knowing that the police can be called for assistance and knowing that when they attend they will use their powers fairly and in accordance with the law is an important source of psychological reassurance. Knowing that one will be treated fairly by the state, which the police represent, is also likely to be a vital element to one’s sense of belonging to the wider political community (Loader 2006).

3.2.1 Overall ratings of the police

The police in England and Wales retain a strong bedrock of public support. In the latest Crime Survey for England and Wales (year ending March 2019), 75 per cent of adults expressed overall confidence in the police in their area. This has declined since 2011, but nonetheless represents a degree of confidence in the police among a clear majority (see Figure 3.7).

Most local police ratings show steady improvement up to 2012, followed by a general plateau (or marked slow-down in improvement) in ratings to 2018. In the most recent survey however, all measures (except police respectfulness) saw deteriorations. In the year to March 2019, public ratings for police understanding and acting on local concerns, being reliable, treating people fairly and of confidence in local police (although still generally positive) all took a turn for the worse.

Figure 3.6 Percentage of people with high levels of worry about crime

Source: ONS, 2019b




Figure 3.7 Public confidence in the police

Source: ONS 2019d





Figure 3.8 Trust in the professions

Source: Ipsos MORI 2019



Public trust in the police is also high, standing at 76 per cent according to Ipsos MORI (2017a and 2019), rising from its historically stable levels of 61 per cent in 1997 and 60 per cent in 2009 (Figure 3.8). The public trust the police more than “the ordinary man or woman in the street”, civil servants, the clergy and television news readers, although less than judges, doctors and teachers.

3.2.2 The experience of policing varies among different social groups

As with the fear of crime public confidence in the police is not felt equally among the population. The latest CSEW data shows women (77 per cent) have slightly more confidence in the police than men (74 per cent). There are age differences but they are not huge: 77 per cent of 16-24 year olds are confident in the police, falling to 72 per cent for 45-54 year olds, before rising to 81 per cent of those aged 75 and over. Those living in the 20 per cent most deprived areas by employment have 10 per cent lower confidence than the least deprived areas of England and Wales (ONS, 2019b).

There are significant differences in confidence between ethnic groups (Figure 3.9). Overall confidence in the police is lowest among people of mixed ethnicity (68 per cent) and black people (70 per cent), compared to white people (75 per cent) and highest among Asian people (78 per cent) and people of other ethnicities (77 per cent).

Black people (69 per cent) and people of mixed ethnicity (71 per cent) are less likely to trust the police compared to white people (80 per cent), while Asian people (81 per cent) and people of other ethnicities (83 per cent) are more likely to trust the police.

Black people and those of mixed ethnicity (both 60 per cent) are also less likely to agree that the police treat them fairly, compared to white people (67 per cent), Asian people (74 per cent) and those of other ethnicities (69 per cent).

Black people (82 per cent) and people of mixed ethnicity (83 per cent) also have less confidence that the police would treat them with respect, compared to white and Asian people (both 88 per cent) and those of other ethnicities (87 per cent) (ONS, 2019b).

Black Caribbean respondents have significantly lower confidence in the police than other groups. Compared to white respondents, they are 20 percentage points less likely to agree that the police would treat them with respect, 23 percentage points less likely to agree that the police would treat them fairly and 30 percentage points less likely to agree that the police can be trusted. These figures contribute to a 19 per cent deficit in Black Caribbean respondents’ overall confidence compared to white respondents (Figure 3.9).

Figure 3.9 Perceptions of the police by ethnicity

Source: ONS, 2019b




Table 3.1 Disproportionality in policing and criminal justice (where ethnicity known)

	White	Black	Asian	Mixed	Other (inc Chinese)
Proportion of England and Wales population (2011 Census)	86%	3%	8%	2%	1%
Arrests					
% (2018/19) ¹¹	77%	10%	7%	4%	2%
Per 1,000 pop (2017/18) ¹²	10	35	12	19	11
Stop and search¹³					
% (2018/19) ¹⁴	59%	22%	13%	4%	2%
Per 1,000 pop (2018/19)	4	38	11	11	7
% (s.60 only) (2018/19)	26%	48%	18%	6%	2%
Per 1,000 pop, Met only(2018/19)	11	51	19	17	13
Per 1,000 pop, exc Met (2018/19)	3	19	6	8	2
Use of force (unknown removed)¹⁵					
% of times Taser used (2018/19)	68%	20%	7%	3%	2%
% of times Taser not discharged – drawn, aimed, arced, red-dot (2018/19)	83%	88%	88%	84%	88%
% of times Taser discharged – drive-stun, fired, angle drive-stun (2018/19)	12%	10%	9%	13%	10%
Restraint (inc handcuffing, limb/ground restraints)	73%	16%	6%	2%	2%
Other equipment (inc baton, spit guard, irritant spray, shield)	78%	13%	5%	2%	1%
Firearms	54%	26%	14%	3%	3%
Prison population¹⁶					
% (March 2020)	73%	13%	8%	5%	2%
Children in custody¹⁷					
% (March 2019)	51%	28%	9% (inc Other)	12%	n/a
Deaths in police custody¹⁸					
% of deaths between 2008/09 and 2018/19	85%	8%	3%	2%	1%
Youth cautions¹⁹					
% (2018/19)	83%	11%	5%	n/a	1% (inc Mixed)
Sentencing					
Total sentenced (2018) ²⁰	80%	10%	6%	3%	1%

11 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/849200/statistics-on-race-and-the-cjs-2018.pdf

12 <https://www.ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk/crime-justice-and-the-law/policing/number-of-arrests/latest#full-page-history>

13 <https://www.ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk/crime-justice-and-the-law/policing/stop-and-search/latest#by-ethnicity-and-legislation-over-time>

14 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/849200/statistics-on-race-and-the-cjs-2018.pdf

15 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/853204/police-use-of-force-apr2018-mar2019-hosb3319.pdf

16 <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/offender-management-statistics-quarterly-october-to-december-2019>

17 <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/youth-justice-statistics-2018-to-2019>

18 <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1122775/deaths-in-police-custody-in-the-uk-2019-by-ethnicity/>

19 <https://www.ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk/crime-justice-and-the-law/policing/youth-cautions/latest#by-ethnicity-over-time>

20 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/849200/statistics-on-race-and-the-cjs-2018.pdf

3.2.3 Racial disproportionality in policing and the criminal justice system

These deficits in trust and confidence in the police particularly among Black Caribbean people reflect a long history of discrimination faced by black communities, in which policing has played a role. They also reflect persistent disproportionalities in the use of police powers and in the wider criminal justice system (see Table 3.1).

Table 3.1 shows that almost across the board black people are more likely to be subject to the use of police powers than white people. In 2018/19 for every 1,000 people in England and Wales 35 black people were arrested (compared to 10 white people) and 38 black people were stopped and searched (compared to 4 white people). In London per 1,000 of the population 51 black people were stopped and searched compared to 11 white people.

Although black people made up three per cent of the population of England and Wales, they were subject to police use of force in 22 per cent of Taser incidents, in 16 per cent of restraints, and in 26 per cent of cases in which the police used a firearm. Black people made up 13 per cent of the prison population and black children made up 28 per cent of those in youth custody. Eight per cent of those who died in police custody in the last decade were black.

Those of mixed ethnicity are also disproportionately more likely to be subject to the use of police powers and to be represented in the criminal justice system. Per 1,000 of the population those of mixed ethnicity were arrested 19 times in 2018/19 and stopped and searched 11 times compared to 10 times and four times respectively for white people. Asian people were slightly more likely to be arrested compared to white people, but much more likely to be stopped and searched (11 Asian people were stopped and searched for every 1,000 people, compared to just four white people). Asian people were also disproportionately more likely to be involved in a police shooting incident than white people.

Policing, and how it is experienced, is an important source of both security and insecurity. The disproportionalities in the use of police powers described above, and the lower levels of trust and confidence in the police among black people in particular, therefore represent a major challenge for policing in England and Wales in the years ahead. There is not the space in this report to explore the causes of racial disproportionality in policing and criminal justice, but we will look at these issues in much greater depth in Phase Two of the Review.

3.3 CONCLUSION

The ways in which people experience and think about their own safety and security are as important as the objective threats to public safety set out in Chapter 2.

This chapter has revealed a mixed picture. As we look to the 2020s, public concern about crime has been rising and this is linked to more people believing that crime is going up. This is not driven by any greater fear of personal victimisation, but may reflect the increase in serious violence and in some other crime types in recent years.

The British public as a whole continue to have considerable confidence and trust in the police. By and large they think the police do a good job and treat people fairly.

However, some communities experience policing much more negatively. Black people and those of mixed ethnicity in particular are much less likely than white people to trust the police and to believe they treat people fairly and with respect. These figures are likely to reflect the fact that if you are black you are much more likely to be arrested, stop and searched and subject to use of force by the police than if you are white. Dealing with these inequalities in the way policing is experienced will be central to the task of ensuring that all citizens can live in safety and security in the years ahead.

4. LOOKING AHEAD

So far in this report we have explored how the public safety and security challenges facing England and Wales have evolved over the last two decades. We have described how, while we are in some ways a much safer society than in the 1990s, the digital revolution, greater global interconnectedness and the rise of new social challenges have combined to make the task of ensuring public safety more varied and complex. At the same time concern about crime has been rising and there remain significant inequalities in the way people experience crime and policing.

This chapter looks to the future and discusses how we might expect the landscape we have described in Chapters 2 and 3 to evolve through to the middle of the 21st century.

In undertaking such an exercise it is important to make clear that we do not possess a crystal ball and we are not making firm predictions. As the Ministry of Defence states in its 2018 assessment of Global Strategic Trends '*The only certainty about the future is its inherent uncertainty. And yet we must prepare.*' (Ministry of Defence 2018).

We recognise both that the future is uncertain and that it is important in a Strategic Review of this kind to think about the future. It is in that spirit that we explore some of the major trends that can be expected to shape the context for policing over the next 20 years. In doing so we draw on the contributions we received to our Call for Evidence and our Key Informant Interviews, alongside the broader horizon scanning literature. We draw heavily on the insights contained within the Ministry of Defence's (MoD) sixth Global Strategic Trends report *The Future Starts Today* published in 2018. This substantial piece of work is one of a series published regularly by the MoD's respected Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) and is intended to provide a strategic context for long term planning, not just for the MoD but across government. Given its pedigree, its focus on questions of security and its comprehensive scope it provides a natural starting point for thinking about the future of policing.

In what follows we do two things:

- We identify 10 major trends that look set to shape the context for public safety and security as we head towards the middle of the century;
- We draw out from this analysis seven key insights that are intended to inform the thinking of the Strategic Review.

Before doing so, however, we set out some of the qualifications that ought to be made about undertaking a task of this kind.

4.1 THINKING ABOUT THE FUTURE

Any attempt to think about the future is fraught with difficulty. First, there is the problem of uncertainty. Nassim Nicholas Taleb in his popular book *The Black Swan* (Taleb, 2007) points to the disproportionate impact of events that lie outside the realm of regular expectations. He argues that the spread of the internet, the fall of the Soviet Union and the 9/11 attacks are all examples of such 'black swans'.²¹ The provenance, timing, sequencing and impact of these events, and indeed the way in which they interact with one another, are impossible to predict in advance.

It is certain that such unpredictable events will have a huge impact on the context for public safety, security and policing over the course of the next 20 years. Indeed, as we discussed in Chapter 2, one of the core tasks of policing to respond to disruptive events many of which lie outside the scope of normal expectations. Everything that is set out below is subject to the disruptive impact of such 'discontinuities' (Ministry of Defence 2018).

Second, there is the problem of bias. If we focus simply on ongoing trends then our view of the future will tend to be an overly linear one and "weak signals" of major change may be missed. The MOD tries to deal with this by undertaking an "impact and uncertainty" analysis which is incorporated into its assessment. It also sets out possible alternative future scenarios, which are intended to test and disrupt the tendency to revert to

21 We should note that Taleb argues that the coronavirus pandemic is not a 'black swan', because its occurrence was in line with statistical probabilities. See Taleb (2020) <https://medium.com/incerto/corporate-socialism-the-government-is-bailing-out-investors-managers-not-you-3b31a67bff4a>

what one of our Key Informant Interviewees described as a “default future” (Ministry of Defence 2018). While we do not have the resources to undertake such an exercise here, we point the reader to a forthcoming piece of work on the future police operating model by the College of Policing, which incorporates such thinking into its methodology.

Despite these challenges thinking about the future is necessary. Indeed, a number of our interviewees pointed out that there is far too little long term thinking and planning within the police service:

4.2 THE MAJOR TRENDS

With the above qualifications in mind, it is possible to identify 10 structural trends that are likely to shape the public safety and security context of the next 20 years.²²

4.2.1 Climate change

The global temperature is likely to rise by between one and two degrees Celsius by 2050, almost certainly as a result of human activity. Global warming is likely to lead to more frequent and more intense extreme weather events such as floods, droughts, storms, heat waves and heavy rainfall. Drought and heat stress will be disruptive for agriculture, causing problems with food supply.

Climate change mitigation measures in sectors such as energy, while necessary, will be costly in the short term and will place a strain on public finances. The impact of more natural disasters and resource shortages could lead to more military conflict and each of these increases the push factor behind migration from the Global South to the Global North. There could also be displacement of people within the UK and those less resilient and least prepared to mitigate the effects will be at the biggest disadvantage.

Political protest, already rising in recent years, is likely to spread and intensify as we approach a climate change “tipping point” and citizens demand greater action from world governments.

4.2.2 Global resource shortages

As the human population grows and living standards improve, demand for (and competition over) limited resources is expected to increase. For example, demand for water is expected to rise by between 20 and 30 per cent by 2050. It is also estimated that by the middle of the century food production will need to be 50 per cent higher than in 2012. Some rare minerals used in industrial processes are likely to be in shorter supply. Some nations may attempt to restrict access to such resources for geo-political gain, potentially resulting in military conflicts. Food shortages and higher prices for staple goods could result in protests, riots and political upheaval.

4.2.3 Population growth and demographic change

The world population is expected to reach 9.8 billion by 2050, rising from 7.8 billion today.²³ Medical advances mean that global life expectancy is expected to rise from 70 in 2015 to 82 by 2050 and will reach even higher levels in wealthier countries. The global population over the age of 60 will rise from 12 per cent in 2015 to 20 per cent by 2050. Ageing will put pressure on health, social care and pension budgets, increasing the need for tax rises and potentially crowding out other areas of public expenditure, unless compensated for by revenues from increased immigration (importing more economically active people) or higher economic growth (OBR 2018).

Global migration is expected to continue to increase as a result of the ease of travel, the economic opportunities in wealthier countries and the intensification of push factors such as military conflict, political unrest and poverty. Migration produces cultural and economic benefits for host countries but can also lead to discrimination against migrants, integration challenges and social tension.

Urbanisation looks set to continue and it is estimated that an extra two billion people will be living in cities by 2050, although the growth of cities will be most marked in poorer countries.²⁴ This will boost economic growth but if not properly managed we could see the emergence of large cities that are poorly governed and suffer from material degradation.

22 Unless otherwise stated the material below is sourced from *Global Strategic Trends. The Future Starts Today* (Ministry of Defence, 2018), and informed by our Call for Evidence and Key Informant Interviews.

23 <https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/world-population-2020-overview>

24 We should note that the coronavirus pandemic may impact upon this trend by encouraging more people to work from home.

The risk of global pandemics could increase, as agricultural intensification enables more viruses to transfer from animals to humans and poverty, increased population density and the ease of global travel mean such viruses are able to spread more rapidly.

Obesity is likely to continue to rise and many more people will live for longer with chronic diseases such as heart disease and cancer. Single occupancy living, which is forecast to rise to 41 per cent of households in England by 2033 (it was 12 per cent in 1961) is likely to result in greater social isolation, particularly among older people. Social isolation is strongly linked to adverse mental health, loneliness and vulnerability to crime. Mental health problems may also be exacerbated by the growth of harassment, scrutiny and bullying in online spaces.

More people around the world will go to school and achieve a higher education, although major inequalities in access to education will remain. Increased life expectancy and higher state pension ages may make current models of education and training unsustainable, resulting in an increased demand for “through life learning”.

4.2.4 A changing economic and geo-political balance

Emerging economies such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Turkey are set to have a larger share of global GDP by 2050 than the current G7. China is estimated to have an economy 40 per cent larger than the United States by 2050 and India is expected to become a major economic power. If Asia becomes economically dominant it is reasonable to suppose that it will also emerge as the centre of global political and military power.

The fastest growing states are likely to be in Asia and the amount of global trade between developing economies will increase. Asia will become more important, and the West correspondingly less so, as a centre for finance, banking, law, accountancy and insurance.

International institutions such as the UN, the World Bank and the IMF will need to adjust to the rise of new powers or may be undermined. Developed economies like the UK will have a lower share of global trade and, with older and relatively smaller populations, may struggle to achieve the growth levels necessary to support existing living standards and social commitments. Protectionist sentiment could lead to increasing conflict over trade and even cause military conflict between the major global powers.

4.2.5 An expanded and unregulated information space

As processing power, the volume and variety of data and connectivity grow exponentially, information will become ever more central to human life. Digital technology will drive innovation and data driven tools will be able to solve problems of greater complexity. Ever more information will flow across national boundaries, much of it generated by machine to machine communication.

As the volume of data grows it may be that the tendency of people to select information from sources that confirm their existing biases may be reinforced, increasing the existing trend towards “digital echo chambers” and posing challenges to social cohesion.

Lightly regulated information spaces may be more easily subject to external manipulation by malign actors. The rise of smart sensors, wearable tech and the Internet of Things is likely to increase concern about a “surveillance society” and an erosion of privacy, as well as exposing people to new forms of internet crime.

There is likely to be increased conflict between those who support greater regulation of this information space, perhaps through national and regional “cyber borders”, and those who, for economic and ideological reasons, support the unfettered flow of information.

4.2.6 Automation

The development of sensors, artificial intelligence and robotics should mean that much more economic and social activity is automated. Automation could reduce the time it takes to develop new products and, alongside 3D printing, allow more products to be designed around the consumer. If managed well automation could create greater leisure time and prosperity. However, as more jobs are replaced by machines many people could become unemployed. Nation states will have to rethink their labour market and welfare policies in order to mitigate the social effects of this transition. The rise of artificial intelligence will pose major ethical dilemmas as machines are used increasingly to guide and even replace human decision-making.

4.2.7 Advances in medical and bio technology could extend life and push the frontiers of human empowerment and enhancement

New medical technology, regenerative medicines and personalised medicine could extend human life and ensure more years free of illness. Human

enhancement technologies, including gene editing, physical and cognitive prosthesis and pharmaceutical enhancement could push forwards the boundaries of human performance. There will be major ethical issues to be addressed, but it seems likely there will also be substantial pressure on states not to be left behind as competing powers exploit these opportunities and gain a competitive advantage as a result.

4.2.8 Inequality and social fragmentation

The rise of developing economies should mean a continued reduction in absolute poverty and an overall improvement in global living standards. However, inequality within countries could rise owing to population growth, job scarcity, and the impact of automation. The concentration of economic growth in cities could lead to greater inequalities in living standards between urban centres and rural areas producing political conflict between those at the vanguard of economic growth and those left behind. The rise of inequality is not inevitable and indeed income inequality has fallen in some parts of the world (such as South America) in recent years, but reducing inequalities will require substantive policy intervention by governments.

4.2.9 Rising individualism and social liberalism, and a reaction against it, will shape political contestation

There are reasons to expect trends towards greater social liberalism and individualism to continue. People will be more likely to travel and develop relationships outside the communities into which they were born, they will be more likely to experience a higher education and they will have access to almost limitless volumes of information which will flow readily across borders. Rising living standards and the expansion of the middle class in developing countries might also be expected to foster more socially liberal mindsets.

However, the rise of social liberalism seems likely to generate a counter reaction from those who see traditional values under threat. This ideological cleavage may also map onto, and feed off, a socio-economic divide between the urban centres that are at the vanguard of economic development and the rural and semi-rural areas that may increasingly feel left behind.

Box 4.1 shows some of the differences between generations in social attitudes that may come to shape political contestation in the years ahead.

Box 4.1 Differences in social and political attitudes across generations

Differences in generational attitudes support the idea that there is a trend to greater social liberalism. According to Ipsos MORI (Ipsos MORI, 2017b), millennials (those born between 1980 and 1995), are

- More likely than Generation X and Baby Boomers to disagree that 'it is the husband's job to earn money while the wife stays at home'.
- Less likely than older generations to think that sexual relations between two adults of the same sex is wrong (only one in ten think this compared to 39 per cent of the pre-war generation).
- Less likely (in 2014) to believe that immigration/race relations are the most important issues facing Britain today. Only 26 per cent of Millennials thought that compared to 33 per cent of Generation X, 43 per cent of Baby Boomers, and 48 per cent of the Pre-War generation.
- Less likely than older generations to vote or identify with a political party;
- Less likely than older generations to support the redistribution of wealth by government.

Comparing Generation Z (those born after 1996) with Millennials when they were at the same age, Ipsos MORI found that Generation Z are:

- More trusting of other people (61 per cent in 2017 compared to 36 per cent in 2002).
- More likely to buy ethically (26 per cent compared to 19 per cent).
- Less likely to see smoking cannabis as risky (72 per cent compared to 84 per cent).
- More likely to see binge drinking as risky (70 per cent compared to 56 per cent).
- Less likely to identify as solely heterosexual (66 per cent compared to 71 per cent) and more likely to have more fluid attitudes to gender, including thinking it is important to provide gender neutral toilets and being less likely to buy gender specific products.

4.2.10 The erosion of state sovereignty

The state is likely to continue to be the major political actor in shaping societies and global events, although its autonomy and power will be challenged by rival actors. The rise of cities may lead to pressures for greater devolution of powers within states to the sub national level. The territorial integrity of the UK is likely to continue to be in question.

The expansion of an information space that lies outside the jurisdiction of individual states will augment the role of non-state actors, such as the social media companies and other global providers of digital infrastructure. If governments and law enforcement bodies are unable to effectively deal with problems like cybercrime, it seems likely that private actors will take on more of a primary role in providing cyber security and investigating crime.

4.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC SAFETY, SECURITY AND POLICING

We have identified 10 trends that look set to shape the global context as we approach the middle of the 21st century. What are the implications of these for public safety, security and policing?

The three drivers of change that we identified in Chapter 2 (the digital revolution, globalisation and more complex social needs) look set to continue, although as noted above all of this is subject to uncertainty and many of the trends associated with these drivers seem likely to provoke counter reactions with varying degrees of impact.

Here we describe nine implications for public safety and security that we will need to consider as we move into the second phase of this Review.

First, **the information space** will become an ever more central terrain in which public safety and security are negotiated. As we use more and more connected devices, including devices connected to our bodies and even our brains, we will become more vulnerable to malicious intervention by cyber actors. This requires nothing short of a transformation in the way we seek to advance public safety.

Currently the information space is largely unregulated, operating beyond the reach of the nation state. Whether and how to regulate that space in order to protect citizens from harm will be a central public policy question over the next 20 years. Within that broader debate policymakers will need to decide what the role of the public police service should be in enforcing rules and laws on the internet, and what skills and competencies those working within policing will require if they are to successfully perform such a role. Just as policing needs to be considered as part of a wider public safety system locally and nationally, it will also need to be considered as part of a wider system of actors in the information space.

If formal and politically accountable forms of rule enforcement, such as public policing, cannot adequately provide protection in the information space then it seems likely that alternative non state actors will continue to emerge to fill the vacuum. This will be in the shape of private sector cyber security and investigatory bodies, but also potentially through accelerated forms of cyber vigilantism.

It should be emphasised that none of this is to say that the physical and the proximate will no longer matter. Our homes, neighbourhoods and places of work and leisure will continue to matter enormously as sites of security and safety, and many of the more traditional demands on policing will remain central to police work. However, given the intermingling of our online and offline lives, it is clear that regulating and enforcing rules in the information space will be a necessary condition for providing public safety in local homes, streets and businesses.

Second, policing will need to invest in the **digital tools** required to operate effectively in this new environment. The speed of innovation among groups committing cybercrime only increases this need. As they invest in new technology police agencies will need to address, with public input, the **major ethical questions** that arise as a result. These include the central question of privacy: the surveillance potential of digital technology is enormous, but how far are citizens willing to let the state intrude into their private information in order to keep them safe? There will be further ethical dilemmas around the degree to which artificial intelligence should be allowed to guide or even substitute human decision making in an area such as law enforcement where ethical judgments are routinely required.

Third, **high impact disruptive events** could become more frequent. This will be driven by the impact of climate change which will make extreme weather events much more likely and intense, even in Britain. Climate change may also trigger increased political unrest. Pandemics will continue to be a major risk to public health, given that international mobility and urbanisation could increase further.

In so far as the police will continue to play a leading role in responding to such events, they will need to become increasingly agile and adaptable, capable to mobilising resources quickly across police force boundaries. This has implications for questions such as the size and composition of the police workforce that we must address in Phase Two.

Fourth, the policing of **social tension and public order** will become more challenging. In the information

space the reinforcement of “digital echo chambers” may make incidents of hate crime, harassment and bullying more likely, requiring a policing response. Online disputes may spill over into conflict on the streets. As we approach climate tipping point more militant climate activism, including widespread civil disobedience seems likely, and will attract public sympathy, requiring sensitive policing. The increase in many of the push factors causing migration from the global South, plus the need for the UK to attract more people of working age, is likely to mean higher levels of immigration. This in turn could result in social tensions unless effectively managed.

The police will only be one actor in the management of these tensions, but to the extent that they will play such a role strengthening their legitimacy as an “honest broker” will be critical.

Fifth, the **economic and fiscal fortunes of the UK** could be challenging, which could both increase complex social demands on policing and constrain the resources available to deal with them. Even before the coronavirus pandemic the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) was forecasting a tight fiscal context as we move through the 2020s and 2030s (OBR 2018). This is a result of the need to spend much more on health, social care and pensions as the population becomes steadily older. It is also due to the likelihood that the relative position of most wealthy countries in the West, including the UK, is likely to decline in comparison with the Asian economies. The additional fiscal challenges that will result from the economic downturn and huge increase in state support required during the coronavirus pandemic will only limit further the fiscal room for manoeuvre. Unless taxes rise significantly this could constrain further investment in policing beyond the current uplift in police numbers. Debates over the value of police funding over investment in other areas, which have intensified in the US and to some extent here since the murder of George Floyd, are likely to continue.

Sixth, policing will continue to be presented with **more complex social demands**. The projected rise in social inequality, as well as the constraints on public spending, could mean that policing is presented with ongoing challenges linked to those who suffer from multiple disadvantages.

All of this will require policing to work in a much more collaborative and even in some senses more fully integrated way with other actors and agencies. Developing a clear understanding of what role we want the police to perform in dealing with complex social

problems and of how they work with others as part of a wider system of public safety will be a central question in the years ahead.

Seventh, organised crime groups will exploit the opportunities this picture presents. In particular, immigration crime and associate crimes of modern slavery are likely to expand if resource shortages and climate change lead to an increased desire to migrate. Organised crime groups will also be major actors in the information space innovating in new ways to steal data, commit fraud and exploit the vulnerable. Ensuring that we have policing capabilities to tackle these groups who operate across borders and are becoming increasingly networked and agile, will be a core challenge of the next decade and beyond.

Eighth, the picture that we described in Chapter 2 of a public safety landscape that is becoming more varied and complex looks set to continue. It will become correspondingly more challenging for policing, with its limited resources, to meet these challenges, certainly on their own and certainly in the way police agencies are currently constituted. There is a danger of a **growing public expectations gap** developing and people may look elsewhere for protection. This could be benign, as communities seek to organise themselves to find alternative routes to promoting public safety. Or it could be a malign if we see an increase in unlawful vigilantism that could itself create fear and insecurity.

Finally, policing will continue to be subject to considerable public scrutiny and there will be pressure for **greater accountability**. There are likely to be continued calls for the persistent racial disproportionalities in the use of police powers to be addressed. These concerns will also play out in new ways as the police deploy new technologies and engage in new methods of surveillance. Attending to these central questions of trust and confidence will be critical tasks in the years ahead.

4.4. CONCLUSION

The future is inherently uncertain and some of the most important events that will shape the context for policing and public safety and security are impossible to predict in advance. Nonetheless it is still important that we think about and plan for the future. Indeed, it is arguable, as interviewees we spoke to and contributors to our Call for Evidence made clear, that policing (many of whose core functions are reactive) thinks too little about the future.

In this chapter we have scoped out some of the major trends that are likely to shape the context for public safety and security as we approach the middle of the 21st century. We have also sought to draw out some of the major implications of these for policing. A central thread that runs throughout is the need to develop a much clearer understanding in the years ahead of what role we want the public police service to perform. What are the police for? What role can they uniquely play in dealing with the challenges identified? And how should they operate as part of a wider constellation of actors who each contribute in some way to public safety and security? It is these questions of role and purpose that we now turn.

5. THE ROLE OF THE POLICE IN PROMOTING PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY

Now that we have laid out the nature of the challenges to public safety and security and how these are expected to evolve in the coming years, we felt it was important to explore, provisionally at this stage, the role of the police in helping to meet those challenges.

The wider scope, increased variety and intensified complexity of the public safety and security challenges described in this report require us to think afresh about the role of the police. The police service was created to perform its task in a different age. While its role has developed over the years, much of this has been more by accident than design. It is notable that in the report of the 1962 Royal Commission on the Police the role of the police is rather taken for granted, simply assumed from a list of tasks that the role of the police at that time performed (Royal Commission on the Police 1962). It seems to us that the transformation in the nature of the landscape of public safety and security requires us to think much harder and more imaginatively about the role of policing in the 21st century.

Given the importance of this question we will return to it in greater depth at the outset of Phase Two of the Strategic Review. However, we set out here some of the thinking that we have done so far and conclude with a set of working assumptions about the role of the police that will help frame our thinking as we approach Phase Two.

In this chapter we do four things:

- First, we state why it is important to discuss the mission and purpose of the police.
- Second, we discuss what the public think about the role of the police service and police priorities, drawing on the Police Foundation's recent focus group research.
- Third, we critically review three major perspectives on the police mission: the police as crime fighters, the police as order maintainers and the police as protectors of the vulnerable.

- Finally, we set out our working assumptions about the purpose of the police, which are intended to help provide a focus for our work as we embark on Phase Two of this Review.

5.1 WHY IT IS IMPORTANT TO DISCUSS THE ROLE OF THE POLICE

There has been a long-standing debate in this country and beyond about the role of the police. As Ian Loader states in his Insight Paper commissioned to inform this Review *'there are good reasons to be weary of another ride over this well-trodden ground. The debate has long circled around the same set of dilemmas, the same binary oppositions.'* (Loader 2020).

Nevertheless, we felt that it was important to revisit this question for the following reasons. First, the police exercise a monopoly on the lawful use of force and, in a democracy, it is important to scrutinise how that power is being deployed and for what purpose.

Second, the police are funded to the tune of £12 billion a year from public funds. There are other ways this money could be spent to contribute to public safety. We need to be clear about what we expect the police to do in order to assess how effective they are in achieving it and to decide what the role of other actors and institutions should be.

Third, this question needs to be revisited regularly in the light of social change. The scale of recent changes in police demand has been described in Chapter 2. And yet over the course of the last 20 years there has never been an explicit redesign of the police role. Rather the police have accreted tasks over time, often in response to changes in demand, often in responses to changes in the law imposing new duties. Given the scale of the changes in the external environment described above, we believe it is vital that we have a much more explicit discussion about what the role and purpose of the police should be.

Finally, some of the standard responses to this question within policing and public policy are inadequate. As Ian Loader describes one common response to the question “what are the police for?” is simply to list all of the things that the police currently do. Indeed, that was the approach taken by the 1962 Royal Commission on the Police, which set out the functions of the police as being:

1. The maintenance of law and order and protection of persons and property.
2. The prevention of crime.
3. The detection of criminals.
4. Controlling of road traffic and advising local authorities on traffic questions.
5. Carrying out certain duties on behalf of government departments.
6. Befriending anyone who needs help and being available at any time to cope with minor or major emergencies.

The problem with this approach is that it wrongly turns an ‘is’ into an ‘ought’. It does not ask whether this is what the police should be doing. In failing to do that it

cannot help with the challenge of prioritisation, which has become so much more acute since the onset of austerity in 2010. The strategic and operational reality is that, even if the police assert that they do all of these things, in reality they are always making choices about which activities are more important than others. It would be better from an accountability point of view to be explicit rather than implicit about those choices and the reasons for making them. As one interviewee told us “if [a mission statement] becomes a list of things you’re supposed to do, it’s pointless”.

Another tendency described by Professor Loader is to refer back to the Peelian Principles. The standard list of these principles found on the Home Office website is set out in Box 5.1. While many of these principles do have an animating value in shaping the ethos of British policing, particularly the importance of policing by consent, they are not on their own an adequate description of the police mission. For one thing they tend to focus on how policing should be done, rather than what its objectives are. For another thing their “timeless appeal” is a result of their generality which again does not help with placing boundaries around what the police should and should not be doing or what they should or should not be prioritising.

Box 5.1 The Peelian Principles

1. To prevent crime and disorder, as an alternative to their repression by military force and severity of legal punishment.
2. To recognise always that the power of the police to fulfil their functions and duties is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and behaviour and on their ability to secure and maintain public respect.
3. To recognise always that to secure and maintain the respect and approval of the public means also the securing of the willing co-operation of the public in the task of securing observance of laws.
4. To recognise always that the extent to which the co-operation of the public can be secured diminishes proportionately the necessity of the use of physical force and compulsion for achieving police objectives.
5. To seek and preserve public favour, not by pandering to public opinion; but by constantly demonstrating absolutely impartial service to law, in complete independence of policy, and without regard to the justice or injustice of the substance of individual laws, by ready offering of individual service and friendship to all members of the public without regard to their wealth or social standing, by ready exercise of courtesy and friendly good humour; and by ready offering of individual sacrifice in protecting and preserving life.
6. To use physical force only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient to obtain public co-operation to an extent necessary to secure observance of law or to restore order, and to use only the minimum degree of physical force which is necessary on any particular occasion for achieving a police objective.
7. To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police, the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.
8. To recognise always the need for strict adherence to police-executive functions, and to refrain from even seeming to usurp the powers of the judiciary of avenging individuals or the State, and of authoritatively judging guilt and punishing the guilty.
9. To recognise always that the test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, and not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them.

It is for these reasons that we decided to go back to the question of the purpose of the police as part of this Review. We did so by commissioning two Insight Papers. The first by the Police Foundation's Research Director Andy Higgins explores what the public think about the role of the police and police priorities. The second by Professor Ian Loader explored different ways of approaching the question of the police mission and offered an interpretative critique of some of the major perspectives. We draw heavily on both papers in the sections that follow.

5.2 WHAT THE PUBLIC THINK

In the Peelian tradition the question of the role and purpose of the police can only be answered with reference to the public. The British police are not only publicly funded, public-facing and publicly accountable, but draw their ideological legitimacy and power from public approval, consent and cooperation. While it is easy to dismiss such ideas as rhetoric, we need only look at the way changing attitudes (rather than changes in crime incidence) have transformed police demand, in relation to rape, domestic abuse and child protection, to see how public and societal expectations powerfully frame the police mission.

In recent decades there have been numerous reforms to attempt to make the police more responsive to public demands, such as the Labour government's public confidence target and David Cameron's introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners. Shifts in the style and focus of British policing, most notably the introduction of neighbourhood policing, have all to some extent been motivated by a desire to give the public the kind of policing they want.

Nevertheless, in recent years a tension has emerged between the shifting focus of policing and the views of the public. With police budgets and officer numbers cut, and the balance of risk shifting from public spaces and volume crime to online threats and hidden harm, many aspects of public facing 'core' policing have effectively been de-prioritised. As a result, concerns have begun to emerge about the health of the police "covenant" with the public (NPCC, 2018) and the "mismatch" between the public's "traditional" expectations and what the police feel compelled to prioritise (HMICFRS, 2019).

In order to address this tension and understand more about what the public thinks about contemporary police priorities, the Police Foundation undertook focus group research in the first half of 2019 in seven police force areas (see Higgins 2020 for the detailed findings). The aim was to develop a deeper and more sophisticated appreciation of the public's views on police priorities than surveys and traditional consultations typically provide.

The research methodology was primarily qualitative, but as well as investigating existing public opinions, our focus groups contained "deliberative" elements that sought to explore how people's views changed in the light of new contextual information, and when given the chance to consider it in-depth and alongside peers (Burchardt, 2012; Taylor, 2018a, 2018b). This work was supplemented by analysis of the findings of representative public opinion surveys and published as our first Insight Paper earlier this year (Higgins 2020).

From this work, we highlight three main findings relevant to our discussion of the role and purpose of the police.

5.2.1 There is strong public support for visible local policing

It is notable that there has been a steady drop in the numbers of people saying they have seen police in their local area since 2012. A local police presence remains important to most people but only one in four are satisfied with the current level of visible patrol where they live (BMG, 2019 (p.26)).

In our focus group research, the lack of, and need for more visible policing was regularly and spontaneously raised by respondents. In their rankings of police priorities, participants tended to give high importance to "providing a presence on the streets".

This demand for visible policing is, of course, long-standing, but that is not to say that the sentiments and rationale behind it do not change over time. In fact, several recurring themes from our discussion groups point to concerns that seem specific to the current context.

First, the desire for a greater police presence was expressed most often in the context of a general sense of "deterioration" in the quality and atmosphere of familiar local public spaces (such as town centres, parks and shopping precincts). In many locations respondents identified empty shops, civic disrepair, street homelessness and visible drug and alcohol misuse as signs of a local "turn for the worse" and saw these changes as indicators of increased threat. The instinctive response to this increased sense of nearby malignancy was often to call for a greater deterrent police presence.

Second, it was also clear that for some, this local sense of "edge" and unease had become intertwined with the national narrative of an advancing knife crime "epidemic", and a sense that once remote threats were coming "closer to home".

Third, in the context of the perceived reduction in services, respondents expressed some lack of faith and clarity about what the police “offer” to the public currently entails. Against this ambiguity, visible policing was seen as tangible evidence of at least some policing.

5.2.2 There is support for the police prioritising high harm offences

Neighbourhood police officers, Police and Crime Commissioners and local councillors and MPs across the country, will be familiar with the array of “everyday” complaints about antisocial behaviour, “minor” crime, incivility and nuisance that members of the public bring to their attention most vociferously.

A dip-sample of 200 “neighbourhood priorities” recently pulled from the www.police.uk portal, and all (presumably) set following some level of public representation and consultation, provides an illustration. 28 per cent of these relate to antisocial behaviour (in general), 14 per cent to local vehicle crime or burglary, 13 per cent to public drugs activity, seven per cent to road safety, followed by nuisance motorbikes, alcohol related disorder and a host of issues from prostitution and parking to fly tipping and begging (see Higgins, 2019 for full analysis).

So, many people are demanding a response to these low level issues. However, in our focus groups when presented with a wide-ranging set of policing issues and asked to consider what “the police should prioritise...” these “low-level” issues (parking, fly tipping, nuisance motorbikes, shoplifting, aggressive begging, road safety etc) tended to gravitate to the bottom of people’s lists; (no more than one in ten, and often fewer than one in 20 respondents gave these issues a “high” priority ranking).

Of the visible, persistent crime and antisocial behaviour issues included in the item set, only alcohol related crime and disorder and (in particular) public place drugs activity regularly attracted higher rankings.

Instead our focus group participants, when asked to choose between competing priorities, wanted the police to concentrate on serious and sexual violence as their top priorities; with terrorism and organised crime also featuring strongly due to their perceived impact. The comparatively high aggregate rankings for child protection, modern slavery and domestic abuse also show that the focus groups respondents recognised harms that often go unreported and occur out of the public gaze. In our focus groups this public orientation towards harm – and violence specifically – was widespread and unequivocal.

This leads us to reflect that when asking the public about what they want the police to do there are two ways of asking the question that tend to elicit different answers. If you ask an individual what they want as a “consumer of public security”, they will tend to refer to the things that most affect them personally, most of which for most people will be fairly low level in terms of harm. If by contrast you ask people as citizens what they think their local police *should* prioritise from an array of possible choices, then they tend to universalise their thinking and consider what priorities would be in the public interest.

This leads us to conclude that if the police want to reduce the tension between what they are now doing and what the public has tended to expect of them, they ought to engage members of the public in precisely these kinds of deliberative processes.

5.2.3 The public have a traditional view of the police role

In addition to assessing harm, the second thing people do when asked to make judgements about what the police should prioritise, is draw on a set of deeply embedded preconceptions about the role and responsibilities of the police within society, relative to those of other agencies, communities, citizens, and other actors. This tends to reflect a rather narrow and “traditional” understanding of police work that places much of what is now well-established preventative and/or “welfare” related activity at the edge (if not beyond) the police remit – and therefore lower down the priority list.

Although the public recognise the range and diversity of modern public safety challenges, when it came to deciding what police (specifically) should do in response, the public have not moved far away from “standard” police tactics (Weisburd and Eck, 2004). In terms of the “how” of policing, focus groups respondents prioritised rapid response, deterrent presence, and (proactive as well as reactive) investigation as part of a criminal justice intervention model.

Although providing a “generalist” emergency service was widely recognised as a crucial part of the police function, when people learnt about the way “welfare and safety” demand was increasingly impacting on resources, they often felt compelled to limit this to what was “crime-related” or “just the immediate crisis”.

Participants in our focus groups sensed a ‘mission creep’ in policing and felt the need to resist it.

5.3 DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE PURPOSE OF THE POLICE

Having explored the views of members of the public in our focus groups, we now examine three positions often taken in the debate on the role of the police. In discussing these we aim to highlight some of the strengths and weaknesses of these positions and in doing so develop some working assumptions about the purpose of policing which can provide focus to our work in the second phase of the Review. In what follows we draw heavily on the Insight Paper *Revisiting the Police Mission* by Ian Loader 2020.

5.3.1 The police as crime fighters

The notion that the role of the police is mainly or only to fight crime has an enduring appeal. Politicians from across the spectrum have routinely stated that they want the police to focus on their core function of fighting crime. For example, in 2011 the then Home Secretary Theresa May urged the police to pursue “just one objective – to cut crime” (May 2011). We should note from our focus group findings that this position resonates with the general public, who also tend to see the police as principally a crime fighting body.

It is of course a core function of the police to tackle crime, by enforcing the law, investigating crimes, apprehending suspects and placing them before the courts. The police have also always had a crime prevention role, as set out in the Peelian principles, initially understood as a visible uniformed presence on the streets acting as a deterrent to would-be offenders. This idea of “bobbies on the beat” keeping criminals in check continues to have a popular appeal to this day.

Nevertheless, in its 2015 report on police demand the College of Policing reported that 83 per cent of calls to police Command and Control Centres do not result in a crime being recorded (College of Policing 2015). A recent piece of qualitative research with new police recruits found that while officers initially believed that their work would be crime focused, they discovered over their first few years in post that most of their work does not involve responding to crime but rather to a whole array of other incidents (Charman 2018).

The problem with the crime fighting view is that it is simply false as a reading of the history of policing in this country and that it does not reflect the reality of public demand on policing.

5.3.2 The police as order maintainers

The second popular position in the debate about the role of the police is that rather than being crime fighters their principal role is to resolve conflict and maintain order. They do this principally owing to their monopoly on the legitimate use of coercion. The very fact of police power is enough in many cases to diffuse tension and impose social stability.

This interpretation is in line with most historians’ readings of the formation of the police service in the 1820s. There was rising concern at that time about the threat to the social order amidst rapid industrialisation and urbanisation. The role of the police was to manage the tensions that arose and repair breakdowns in the social order.

The sociologist Egon Bittner famously encapsulated this view of the police as order maintainers by saying that the reason people call the police is to deal with “something-that-ought-not-to-be-happening-and-about-which-someone-had-better-do-something-now!” Once called to an incident the police role is then to impose *provisional solutions* to breakdowns in the social order through their possession of lawful coercive powers.

This view of policing is supported by the empirical reality of police work referred to above: the vast majority of calls to the police do not relate to the commission of criminal offences (College of Policing 2015). The police respond routinely to all sorts of incidents (mental health crisis, missing persons, antisocial behaviour and so on) that are not crimes or related to crime.

However, the problem with this position is that its conception of the police role is so broad that it can be susceptible to mission creep. Although Bittner was describing a largely reactive order maintenance role, many advocates of this position see policing as having a much more proactive mission, to help contribute broadly to public safety, to solve local problems, to prevent crime before it occurs and even to contribute to wider social wellbeing.

As Ian Loader comments: “*This extended role for the police in order upkeep and public protection may bring benefits for vulnerable individuals and communities. But the attendant risks lie in the difficulties of specifying the nature and limits of police involvement in such collaborations and the colonisation of tasks that are more suited to being undertaken by, say, social work, education, or public health.*” (Loader 2020).

5.3.3 The police as protectors of the vulnerable²⁵

The final conception of policing we discuss here is a more contemporary one that has emerged in recent years as the police have taken on more and more work related to protecting those with multiple disadvantages (who tend within policing to be generally referred to as “the vulnerable” or “vulnerable people”) from harm. This position partly reflects changing demand on policing but it is also motivated by a normative drive to protect previously hidden victims of crime, in particular those that are harmed in the home or private settings, as well as increasingly online. The victims of offences such as modern slavery, child sexual exploitation and abuse and domestic violence do not generally report these crimes to the police and have in the past been seriously let down by the police and the wider criminal justice system. These victims are often repeat victims and many have complex needs. The harm done to them can be among the most serious the police deal with.

This conception of the police role seems to capture a steady direction of travel for policing in England and Wales and given the moral imperative behind it, seems persuasive as an animating purpose for the police. Nonetheless, there are some problems with this approach. One is that it suffers from the same risk of over reach as the order maintenance frame: it is rarely articulated why it is for the police and not some other agency to undertake this protective work. There is a related concern that if these issues are approached through a “police lens”, as opposed to a health or social work lens, there is a danger that those suffering from multiple disadvantage will be more likely to be subject to enforcement.

The other problem is the tension this conception of policing sets up between safeguarding those who are most disadvantaged and excluded versus providing a universal service to the public as a whole. It is already clear that if high harm and vulnerability cases are prioritised many people will simply not get a substantive response when they report a standard volume crime to the police. To the extent that policing continues to require the support and the confidence of the wider public, there are risks in taking this on as the preeminent purpose of the police.

5.4 CONCLUSION

From the work we have done so far to sketch the landscape of contemporary policing, including public expectations and the changing nature of the challenge, we have reached the following working assumptions about the purpose of the police. Note that we will revisit these working assumptions at the start of Phase Two where we will consider this question of role and purpose in greater depth.

The first is that **the police are not simply crime fighters**. The contest between the “crime-fighting” and “order maintenance” models of policing is a false dichotomy. Professor Loader rightly counsels against defining the police task as “what the police do”, or simply listing police functions (as the 1962 Royal Commission did), not least because it begs the question of priorities. But there is a wealth of information to show that the bedrock of activity which a 24 hours a day, seven days a week responsive service engages goes well beyond crime, and encompasses a wide range of threats to public order and actual and potential harm to individuals. This is not optional activity. It is, and is likely to continue to be, the reality of front-line policing, and it is simplistic to suggest otherwise.

Second, **the police operate as part of a wider system of actors who contribute to public safety and security**. The increased scope and complexity of the challenges we face mean that the police cannot tackle these issues alone and, in many cases, other actors will be better placed to take the lead. What this broader system of public safety should look like will be a core focus for Phase Two of this Review, where we will seek to understand how the relationships between policing and other agencies and institutions operate and whether they need re-thinking to meet the demands of the 21st century.

Third, **the police should seek to proactively prevent crime and harm, rather than simply respond to it**. The responses to our call for evidence suggest that there is a great appetite for the police to play a proactive and preventative role in relation to crime and other threats to public safety. There is a powerful logic behind these arguments: it is better to prevent problems before they occur. Working upstream may help reduce demand on policing in the longer term. Being more

25 We note here that the word ‘vulnerable’ is a controversial one and throughout this report we have instead used the concept of multiple disadvantage. We use the word here because within policing ‘vulnerability’ tends to be used to describe the work that the police do with those who have multiple disadvantages.

problem oriented also has a strong evidential basis in terms of effectiveness.

Nevertheless, in our work on the preventative role of the police we will need to think about boundaries, about why it is the police (and not some other perhaps better qualified actor) who are taking the lead or doing the work. We note however that there is a corresponding danger of simply narrowing the police task to those situations where the use of police powers are required. If the police task is narrowed to enforcement then this would likely have a deleterious impact on police legitimacy and community relationships.

Fourth, there has been a shift in police work in recent years, as a result of changes in demand and in law, towards **safeguarding and responding to incidents involving people who live with multiple disadvantages**. As a 24/7 general response service

the police inevitably play an important role in dealing with such incidents. It will be important in Phase Two to consider what the scope of their role should be, what should more appropriately be done by others and what skills and competencies police officers require to perform this role most effectively.

Finally, the issue of policing mission not only relates to what the police do, but – crucially – to how they do it. By treating people fairly and with respect, responding to calls for assistance from wherever they come, and engaging with the public and their representatives about how they do their essential work, the police contribute to the public's sense of security and belonging. In Loader's words, they "remain the primary means through which democracies give material and symbolic effect to the democratic promise of security". At its deepest level, the police mission is to fulfil that promise.

6. CONCLUSION

This report has revealed how dramatically the landscape of public safety and security has changed since the turn of the millennium. While we have in some ways become a safer society this is not everyone's experience and new forms of risk and harm have arisen. The expanded scope, increased variety and more complex nature of the challenges we face require us to ask fundamental questions about how we should promote public safety and security in the 21st century.

These challenges require us to think afresh about the role of the police. With limited resources and an established core of existing skills and competencies, the police will not be able to meet all of the demands placed upon them. There is a danger of a growing gap between what the police are able to deliver and what the public has come to expect.

This requires us in Phase Two of this Review to think from first principles about what we think the role of the police should be. In this Report we have set out some working assumptions about this. The police are not just or simply crime fighters. They work in collaboration with others. They ought to be proactive and preventative rather than simply reactive. They ought to have a role in the protection of those who are multiply disadvantaged. And they ought to contribute, not just through what they do but how they do it, to fulfilling the right of all citizens to live in safety and security.

In Phase Two we will think further about the police role, and in particular we will consider the role of other actors and institutions who make a contribution to public safety and security. This includes those who contribute to public safety locally, whether that be health services, local authorities, housing providers, businesses, community based organisations and so forth. It also includes those who contribute to public safety internationally and in the information space, whether that be national government, the large tech companies, the social media platforms and others. Although we remain focused on the work of the police in England and Wales, considering what these wider systems of public safety and security should look like (local, national, international – and informational) will be a core focus of Phase Two of this Review.

Once we have determined what the role of the police should be, we will then examine how they can perform this role legitimately and effectively.

The report has highlighted how people's experience of policing itself has an impact on their security. Being able to rely on the police to respond in times of

emergency to any person, without fear or favour, is a hard-won achievement. However, many within minority communities experience policing negatively and in Phase Two we will explore how the legitimacy of the police can be strengthened particularly among those who currently lack confidence in policing or experience it as a source of insecurity.

Having set out a clear role for the police, we will then examine what skills and competencies they will require to fulfil that role, how the police service should be financed and how it should be structured and held to account.

Therefore, the key questions shaping Phase Two of the Review will be:

1. What is the role of the police, and how should it evolve over the next 20 years, building on the working assumptions set out in this report?
2. What should be the relationship between the public police service and other agencies and actors involved in public safety and security?
3. How can the legitimacy of policing be strengthened, particularly with those parts of our community among whom confidence in the police is low?
4. What are the implications of questions 1, 2 and 3, and of the changing landscape described in this report for the future police workforce?
5. How should the public police service be resourced?
6. How should it be organised, locally, regionally and nationally?
7. How should it be governed and held to account?

We will be issuing a further Call for Evidence to all those with a stake in policing to help us address these questions in the months ahead.

We conclude at this stage that the scope, nature and variety of the challenges we face as a country require us to think afresh about the role of the police in achieving public safety and security. That is what we will do in Phase Two of this Strategic Review.

We are very clear that this work is vital. Public safety and security are crucial foundations for living in freedom. Our ambition is to lay out a vision, and articulate a plan, for a police service that is capable of fulfilling that promise for all our citizens in the new conditions of the 21st century.

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APPENDIX A – CALL FOR EVIDENCE SUBMISSIONS

ADS

Amy Aeron-Thomas, Vision Zero

John Apter, Chair of the Police Federation of England and Wales

Association of Police and Crime Commissioners

Cambridgeshire Constabulary

Capgemini

Phil Cheatle, right to die campaigner

Andy Cooke, Chief Constable of Merseyside Police

City of London Police

College of Policing

Criminal Justice Alliance

On behalf of the Chief Constable of Cumbria Police

Cressida Dick, Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service

Durham Constabulary

Office of the Durham Police, Crime and Victims' Commissioner

Deputy Chief Constable Claire Parmenter and Police and Crime Commissioner Dafydd Llewellyn of Dyfed Powys Police

On behalf of the Chief Constable of Essex Police

Roger Geffen, Policy Director at Cycling UK

Penelope Gibbs, Director of Transform Justice

John Gilli-Ross, Chairman of the National Association of Police Fire and Crime Panels

Jodie Gosling, shadow chair, safer communities in North Warwickshire Borough Council Labour Group

Paul Griffiths, President of the Police Superintendents Association

On behalf of the Police and Crime Commissioner and Chief Constable of Hampshire Constabulary

Roger Hirst, Police and Crime Commissioner for Essex Police

Robin Hodgkinson, retired Sussex Police Officer and member of Sussex CrimeWatch

Chief Inspector Patrick Holdaway of the National Business Crime Centre

Dr Chloe Holloway of the School of Law at University of Nottingham

Howard League for Penal Reform

Keith Hunter, Police and Crime Commissioner of Humberside Police

Caroline Hynds, a campaigner for Assisted Dying

Martin Jelley, Chief Constable of Warwickshire Police

Arfon Jones, Police and Crime Commissioner for North Wales

Just for Kids Law

Peter Langmead-Jones on behalf of Greater Manchester Police

Edward Leigh of Excogitate Consultancy

Lincolnshire Police

London Fire Brigade

Andy Marsh, Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Police

On behalf of Darren Martland, the Chief Constable of Cheshire Police

Kevin Moore, Retired Detective Chief Superintendent at Sussex Police

Sue Mountstevens, the Police and Crime Commissioner for Avon and Somerset Police

David Munro, Police and Crime Commissioner for Surrey Police

National Aids Trust

National Crime Agency

Joint response from the National Police Chiefs Council leads for Neighbourhood Policing, PCSOs, Social Media & Digital Engagement, Troubled Families and the Public Health Approach to Policing

Prof Carole McCartney, Prof Michael Rowe, Marion Oswald, Dr Kyriakos N. Kotsoglou of Northumbria University, Newcastle

On behalf of the Chief Constable and Police and Crime Commissioner of Northumbria Police

Police and Crime Commissioner Paddy Tipping and Chief Constable Craig Guildford, of Nottinghamshire Police

NPCC Local Policing Co-ordination Committee (LPCC)

Alan Pughsley, Chief Constable of Kent Police

Resolve Anti-Social Behaviour

Chris Rowley, Deputy Chief Constable of Humberside Police

Royal United Services Institute

Inspector John Shuttleworth of Devon and Cornwall Police

Dr Jonathan Smith, Director of Salmon Personal Development

Anthony Stansfeld, Police and Crime Commissioner for Thames Valley Police

South Yorkshire Police and Crime Panel

Desmond Thomas, Associate Lecturer at Solent University

Martyn Underhill, Police and Crime Commissioner for Dorset Police

Jeremy Vaughan, Deputy Chief Constable South Wales Police

On behalf of the Chief Constable of West Mercia Police

West Midlands Police

West Midlands Police and Crime Commissioner

West Yorkshire Police

Dr Emma Williams of Canterbury Christ Church University, Centre for Policing Research

APPENDIX B – LIST OF KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWEES

Andy Cooke, Chief Constable Merseyside Police, NPCC
lead Crime Operations

Olivia Pinkney, Chief Constable Hampshire Police,
NPCC Lead for Local Policing and Children and Young
People

Gareth Morgan, Chief Constable Staffordshire Police,
NPCC Lead Communications and Director of Strategic
Command Course

Neil Basu, Assistant Commissioner Metropolitan Police
Service, NPCC Lead for Counter Terrorism

Peter Goodman, Chief Constable Derbyshire Police,
NPCC Lead for Cybercrime

Martin Surl, Police and Crime Commissioner for
Gloucestershire, APCC Board

Paddy Tipping, Police and Crime Commissioner for
Nottinghamshire, APCC Board

Nic Pole, Principle Analyst (Futures), College of Policing

Nina Champion, Director, Criminal Justice Alliance

Suzanne Jacob, Chief Executive, Safe Lives

Anna Edmonson, Head of Policy and Public Affairs,
NSPCC

John Hayward-Cripps, Chief Executive of
Neighbourhood Watch

Melissa Case, Director General, Policy, Analysis and
Communications at Ministry of Justice UK

Martin Griffiths, Clinical Director Violence Reduction
Network NHS London and Trauma Surgery Lead Barts
Health NHS Trust

Professor Martin Innes, Director of Crime and Security
Research Institute and Director of Universities' Police
Science Institute

Professor Betsy Stanko, Consultant, public sector
analytics and Chair, Ministry of Justice Data, Evidence
and Science Board

APPENDIX C – ADVISORY BOARD

Nick Alston CBE, DL, Former Police and Crime and Commissioner for Essex

Sir Michael Barber, Chair of The Strategic Review of Policing in England and Wales

Dee Collins CBE QPM, Former Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police

Nick Dale, Vice President Business Transformation for the UK Justice Sector, CGI

Dr Carlene Firmin MBE, Principal Research Fellow at The International Centre: Researching Child Sexual Exploitation, Violence and Trafficking

Michael Fuller QPM, Former Chief Constable of Kent Police

John Graham, Adviser at The Dawes Trust

Sgt Caroline Hay, Sergeant in the Metropolitan Police Service

Richard Hobbs, UK Policing Lead at Deloitte

Rt Hon Nick Hurd, Former Minister of State for Policing

Sir Bill Jeffrey KCB, Vice Chair of the Strategic Review, Chair of the Police Foundation

Helen King QPM, Principal of St Anne's College, University of Oxford

Sophie Linden, Deputy Mayor of the Greater London Authority

Stephen Lloyd, Former MP for Eastbourne and Willingdon.

Professor Ian Loader, Professor of Criminology at All Souls College, University of Oxford

Sir Denis O'Connor CBE QPM, Former HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary at HMICFRS

Nick Ross, Broadcaster

Rt Hon Jacqui Smith, Former Home Secretary

Dame Sarah Thornton DBE QPM, Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner at the Office of the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner

Rt Hon Sir John Wheeler JP DL, Vice Chair of the Police Foundation and former Chair of the Home Affairs Select Committee

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